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THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

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AID IN INDIGENOUS CULTURES

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APRIL 1953

THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

PUBLISHED BY

THE PAYNE EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED

157 WEST 13TH ST., NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

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THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY is published by The Payne Educational Sociology Foundation, Inc., monthly from September to May, inclusive. Publication and business office, 157 West 13th St., New York 11, N. Y. The subscription price is \$3.00 per year; foreign rates, Canadian and South American, \$3.25, all others, \$3.40; the price of single copies is 35 cents each. Orders for less than half a year will be charged at the single-copy rate.

Entered as second-class matter September 27, 1934, at the Post Office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry at the Post Office at Manchester, N. H., authorized January 16, 1950.

THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY is indexed in *Educational Index*, *Public Affairs Information Service*, and *Business Education Index*.

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
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THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

A Magazine of Theory and Practice

Vol. 26

April 1953

No. 8

PREFACE

Increased mobility of peoples has brought into sharp relationship the value systems of almost every culture with some other. In the early days of the missionary and the trader, the dominant group was that which was backed by the guns. Today, the subjugation of peoples and the interposition of "civilization" upon them is past.

At the same time the conflict in values continues. In almost every indigeneous culture the desire for the higher standards of living, better health, and other fruits of technological societies is in conflict with technology itself. The peoples of the Western world with good intentions, would like to help in this process of bringing about what they would call "a better way of life."

Perhaps the greatest limitation at present is not so much that of what are the values of the one as against the other, but rather a limitation which is to be found in our lack of understanding about values, valuing, and value formation.

The editors of The Journal Of Educational Sociology are indebted to Prof. Green and his distinguished colleagues for the presentation of this groups of papers. They spell out in a dramatic way the distance we have to go before we learn the techniques of working with people without attitudes which make them defensive of their cultural heritage.

The editors are also grateful to the Heimlich Foundation for making it possible to publish the articles in their entirety.

EDITORIAL

Behind the pressing practical problems of S. E. Asia lie fields of theoretical interest which have yet to be explored. Hunger, poverty and disease will not be removed by purely practical means and, however considerable the technological resources available, their potential contribution to social betterment will only be consummated when society and its ways are more fully understood. Myth, tradition and superstition can prevent the farmer from accepting new methods, the mother from adopting an improved hygiene and the family from eating a better diet. The levels of aspiration, the desire for economy of process and the personal social-relationships which have allowed of organized labour in the West are in many places absent in the East. The adjustments which underlie the acceptance of responsibility, social co-operation and the development of social welfare services in the West are similarly largely absent. The motives, ambitions and values of the East are different in many ways from those with which we are familiar in U.S.A., or U.K. And for these reasons, despite the time, effort and money which is being spent in the search for improved standards of living in the East, the rate of progress is regrettably slow.

It is realization of these conditions which has led to the selection of S. E. Asia as the topic for this issue of *The Journal of Educational Sociology*. The search for raised standards of living in S. E. Asia is part of the search for the bases of world peace, a search in which sociologist and educationist must play an increasingly important part. It will be no surprise to those familiar with the work of the Payne Foundation to find that, both directly and indirectly, the papers in this issue are largely concerned with education. "Education", it has been well said, "is Social Philosophy in Action". Education is the chief long term need of the East, because it alone can re-orientate men's minds to new ways of living.

To design a new education however necessitates the prior definition of a philosophy of life—and it is here that the conflicts, tensions and divided aims of the East at once emerge. The countries of S. E. Asia have emerged, or are emerging from varying degrees of political, cultural and economic overlordship. All have, or are seeking, independence, all are seeking social progress, all are affected by accelerated frequencies of external contact, consequent on improved transportation and communication, all are to some extent bound by tradition and none can ignore the fact that they are mutually inter-

dependent units of a world society. It cannot be our purpose to define a philosophy of living for S. E. Asia or any part thereof, but at least we can discuss some of the problems which must be faced in attempting to construct new social patterns.

Of the countries concerned, Ceylon offers the whole in miniature and, in illustrating the results of the impact of the West on the East, offers to sociologist and educationist almost unique laboratory facilities and opportunities. It is for these reasons that all our problems are first discussed in general terms in relation to Ceylon. Here can be seen a society divided into sub-cultural groups on linguistic, religious and ethnic grounds, which has carried ruler-identification to extreme lengths and which is now faced with some degree of cultural isolation as a result of seeking a cultural revival along linguistic lines. Nor is Ceylon alone in facing the problem of language and all that it implies. The overlordship of western powers has, in different areas of S. E. Asia, placed a premium on knowledge of Dutch, French or English by making them the languages of an élite. Today a resurgent nationalism has led to a search for past cultures and the re-instatement of the indigenous language. Thus, as one of the essays shows, there are linguistic problems of considerable complexity to be faced in which the need for world contact and developing in-group feelings are in conflict.

This problem, of achieving a new sense of nationalism and yet retaining, and even extending, inter-national contacts, like the language problem, is one for which education must accept special responsibilities. It thus finds a place very appropriately as the subject of one of the essays and it is perhaps very fitting that it should be discussed against the Indian scene because, for those ready to learn, India has much to offer in both national and international aspects.

The family, a fundamental unit in Western society, is of almost even greater importance in oriental societies. Reference has already been made to the dependence, in certain ways, of the East on the West. One form in which it is seen is in connection with specialist training whereby oriental students go to U.S.A., U.K., and Europe for post-graduate study. A danger in this, not always given due attention, lies in the fact that many of the "England returned" for example, attempt to apply too directly in the East a technique learned in, and designed for, the West. In social welfare work, in delinquency control, in applied psychology and in parental education the family and its problems are important. To assume however that there can be a direct translation of techniques is to run considerable risk be-

cause the concept of family is so different in the two halves of the globe. Moreover, patterns of family organization and responsibility are different and this difference may vitiate arguments based on a western model. Similarly the gradual replacement of familial cottage crafts with co-operative and industrial organization must be undertaken with reference to family structure. In view of these conditions one paper is devoted to this important topic.

Two of the papers are concerned more directly with education which, as was pointed out above, must be the major instrument of social engineering in the East. For centuries eastern education was in the hands of the religious organizations and was cast in a particular mould. This relationship still exists, for example in the "pirivena" or temple schools conducted by the Buddhist priesthood. Such education was concerned with religious principles and such secular activities as reading and writing were but tools used to study a faith. This is understandable and it is a welcome fact that the religious organizations of S. E. Asia are increasing their efforts in this direction. They themselves however have realized that education must mean more than this and have, in many cases, initiated secular schools, such as those of the Buddhist Theosophical Society. The coming of Christian missionaries also acted as a major factor in the development of education and, while their purpose was proselytization they were also concerned with the secular aspects of teaching. Governmental responsibilities for education came later and, because they were usually those of a foreign overlord, they gave to various countries an education based on a western model. Today education is expanding with rapidity but there are many reasons why what is being done is open to criticism. Some of these are discussed in two of our papers, one in relation to aboriginal peoples and one in semi-vocational terms.

The last paper of the series is concerned with a brief survey of a field only now in the initial stages of study in Ceylon. Like much of the rest of S. E. Asia, Ceylon is becoming increasingly dependent upon technology, but again like much of S. E. Asia, Ceylon is faced with a serious shortage of technicians. Technicians must be the products of education and, as the discussion of vocational problems shows, neither education nor social attitudes appear to be leading in this direction. The last paper discloses that the situation is worse than at first appears because, not only does youth not seek practical occupations, nor hold them in high esteem, but it is failing to develop aptitudes which are basic to technical success. The social implications of this situation are potentially a serious threat to the progress which

is looked forward to as a result of the vast expenditures the West is incurring on behalf of the East—lack of progress is not however to be thought of in merely economic terms, because it is a threat to peace.

It will be seen that there are gaps in our survey. The questions of teacher supply and training, of technical education, of general curricular content, of the differential availability of education, of the position of women and of the significance of child rearing practices in relation to basic personality are but a few of the many to which no attention has been given. These however tend to be problems of practical procedure and before adequate solutions can be found it is essential to deal with the basic theoretical questions to which we have turned our attention.

There is a great need for research into the basic problems of the East. If this issue encourages interest which leads others to devote themselves to such research it will have performed a very considerable service and many in S. E. Asia will be indebted to the Payne Foundation for its action in making such an issue possible.

Finally, as Editor of the issue, I should like to acknowledge my personal debt to the Payne Foundation, to the contributors who so readily undertook to write papers in the midst of their normally heavy duties and to Dr. Dan Dodson who gave much wise counsel and encouragement and gracefully accepted many delays.

T. L. Green

WEST AND EAST IN CEYLON

Bryce Ryan

Ceylon, like all Asia, is undergoing forces which Dean Acheson has described as the joint revulsion from the acceptance of poverty and acceptance of foreign domination. But in Ceylon, at least, the Asian revolution is less narrowly conceived. It includes as well the conscious introduction of democratic values, both in the sense of an elected parliamentary government, and of equalizing opportunity. Emerging from an anciently rooted peasant order, dominated by institutions of feudalism, caste, autocracy, and ethnic communalism, supported by a static technology but a pervasive supernaturalism, here indeed is revolution. The fact that Ceylon has been dominated by European powers for more than 400 years complicates, but only slightly reduces, the magnitude of the transition. Summarily, the two thousand year old civilization of Ceylon is being regeared toward the goals of: a) a rising level of living, based upon increased food crop production, minor industrialization, and abetted by socialized welfare programs, especially health; b) welding together diverse ethnic minorities, castes, family and locality minded villages, into a single, nationally self conscious people; c) building up an informed and responsible electorate-citizenry; d) maximizing equality of educational and economic opportunity at the various caste, class, ethnic, and regional levels.

If this summing up sounds suspiciously like the clichés of any American political party's platform, this is only because such goals are today axioms in western democracies. In Ceylon these are objectives upon which most educated Ceylonese would agree. They are implicit in the official utterances of government. But if one would understand the transitions of Ceylon it is vital that these generalized ends be visualized in the context of Ceylonese society and not in the context of the western nations which fathered them. If they sound obvious and even hackneyed in the context of American society, they are not so in the context of Ceylonese society. The very fabric of American society was built out of the revolutionary movements which fathered such ideals. The fabric, the grass roots, of Ceylonese society has known no similar history. These goals are new goals in Ceylon; they are borrowed, transplanted goals brought to a people who in their creation have not themselves been wrenched from a traditional way of life.

This is not to say that the old order, the traditional culture, leaves no room for the rationalization of this new democratic-humanitarian nexus. Many Ceylonese would probably deny that these ideas are new to the East. But the traditional social structure of Ceylon was not reared upon such values, although their expression may surely be found in diverse texts. These statements in the West became points of orientation for total societies, and it is as points of orientation that they are being diffused for the first time in Southeast Asia. As orientation points these goals were forged in the European revolt from medieval institutions. These were the ideas with hands and feet which grew out of the grass roots repudiation of a rigid, repressive, static, albeit "spiritual", feudal order. It is easy to forget that the much publicized antithesis of East and West is largely a result of what happened in Europe in modern times. The traditional way of life, institutions and values of folk Ceylon are the blood kin of those which in Europe were shattered by science, technology, protestantism, individualism, and equalitarianism. When we visualize the revolutionary goals in modern Ceylon we must see them in a folk society where village attitudes and local institutions are still oriented toward more medieval and "folkish" conceptions.

Ceylon is not today as it was in the times of the Sinhalese kings. Nor should it be implied that the most conservative villager would fail to wish for a higher level of living, a prestige position for the Ceylonese nation, a vote and education for his and another's children. Such desires are not foreign to Ceylon. It takes no transformation in western Europe to tell the Ceylonese villager he requires more and better food. What is new, however, is the adoption of these ideas as fixed points in national policy around which attitudes and institutions are to be shaped. Thus, raising the level of living for masses of people as an active social policy has its tap root in modern western welfare philosophy, in accordance with which the traditional prerogatives of parents, employers, landlords, and governors have been reassessed and redefined. As ethical values most of the points of revolution are not new in Asia, but as ends of social policy, these values are typically western, and foreign.

The impact of West upon East is not to be interpreted as the impact of an infinite number of western cultural particles upon an infinite number of dissimilar eastern particles. The core of the problem is in the modification of Asian social institutions and attitudes in adaptation to this new nexus of social policy. The fact that the West has developed techniques consistent with these policies is probably

an assurance that howsoever strong may be the cries for Ceylonese cultural autonomy much of the mechanical and social technology of the West will be falteringly accepted. Ceylonese society will move toward the western pattern through its spontaneous adjustment to the similar ends and probably similar techniques. The Asian nationalist who cries out against westernization but who stands for the new social policy and the new technology is unreasonably concerned. Adjustments being called for are precisely the types of adjustments which have been made in western democracies; the difference lies in the unique social, geographic, and economic details of the social organism now making the adaptations, and the fact that they are being made in a different historical period.

The cultural background upon which new goals and new techniques are being set into operation in Ceylon is complex and heterogeneous. Here is no simple, homogeneous peasant people to be set neatly on the social scientists' scale of folk-urban societies. Ceylon is a mosaic of diverse ethnic groups, of diverse forms of community organization and economy, of diverse religious faiths, within each of which there are varying degrees of urbanization, commercialization, and emancipation from traditional attitudes. Further, colonial administration and missionary activities have had different effects upon various ethnic groups and localities. Ceylon is a multi-dimensional mosaic.

As a locale within which the Asian revolution can be viewed, Ceylon offers unique advantages. Small and unimportant in the world political economy, the island has a significance to the western world that is unmeasured by bulk of population or economic potentials. This significance arises from its unique suitability as a laboratory, an experimental station, within which most of the problems and conditioning factors of Southeast Asia are to be found. Untouched by war, possessed of a stable parliamentary government and unharrassed by threats from without or civil commotion within, Ceylon is in the rare position of being able to expend her full energies upon the constructive transition. If a functioning humanitarian democracy cannot be achieved here, the prognosis for Southeast Asia in general must be dark indeed. What happens in Ceylon will hold lessons for an understanding of problems widespread throughout a vast world region.

With a total island population of over seven million, the Sinhalese are the largest indigenous ethnic group, followed by the Ceylon Tamil and then by the very much smaller Muslim minority. Each of

these groups has been in Ceylon for centuries, preserving a distinctive communal and cultural life, but in modern times, in peaceful, if not always harmonious relations. The Ceylon Tamils are the almost exclusive possessors of the northerly Jaffna Peninsula where there is preserved a typically South Indian Hindu culture and strong consciousness of the Indian ties. The eastern coast of the island is of Ceylon Tamil and Muslim settlement, these two minorities forming separate peasant communities, speaking a common language, but remaining socially distinct. The remainder of the island partially excepting the south-central highlands, is dominated by the linguistically, historically, and culturally distinct Buddhist Sinhalese. The south-central hills, which were subjected to British plantation development, were heavily populated during the last century by imported Indian Tamil estate labor. The Indian Tamil population, slightly larger than that of the Ceylon Tamil, with whom they are culturally similar although socially distinct, is viewed as a non-indigenous minority for whom citizenship under certain conditions may be individually acquired. The urban population, about 15 percent of the total, is concentrated in the southwest coastal area and is a mixture of all these and other minorities.

Economically and demographically the island is heterogeneous. The Tamil dominated and very densely settled Jaffna Peninsula is a land of highly intensive, shallow well irrigated agriculture. Immediately south of the peninsula begin the dry zone jungles which cover a large part of the island, i.e. the entire northern half and the eastern part of the southern half. Here population density is low, the predominant Sinhalese inhabitants living in small, jungle separated villages dependent upon paddy cultivation and chena (fire agriculture). Paddy cultivation is stringently limited by seasoned rainfall and its conservation, the village reservoir being both physically and socially the center of village life. The easterly portions of this great jungle area have sparse settlement indeed; the tanks of ancient days fallen into ruin, and some villagers, including remnants of the aboriginal Veddas, are semi-nomadic chena cultivators. The south-central mountain region is the seat of extensive plantation development, much of it European owned, carried on largely by estate-resident Indian Tamil labor. Except in the highest areas indigenous Sinhalese villages exist, usually in the valleys, cultivating their rain and stream watered paddy and small garden plots. The encroachment of estates has brought sharp and bitterly resented limits to the expansion of village lands. In many localities the village family grudgingly sup

plements its living by estate wage labor. The southern and southwestern coastal areas have both the highest urbanization and the most prosperous peasant living. Here the naturally lush environment has been supplemented by minor industrialization, fishing, commerce, and particularly government employments.

This grossly over-simplified representation of the island's distributive heterogeneity covers up vastly more than it reveals, but it at least validates the fact of wide regional diversity in culture and economy. Regional differences are not merely economic or demographic; the regions present cultural contrasts that are poles apart in the types of reactions they will generate to new social programs, and equally disparate in the types of programs they will require if new goals are to be achieved.

As might be reasonably inferred, the contacts of West upon East, have already been differently felt in various parts of the island. Unless they had been profoundly influential in some sectors there could of course not be today an independent government modeled upon the British. On the other hand it is surprising that a small island so intensively exploited by three successive waves of European conquerors was not more widely affected. The closely limited interests, and geographically limited infiltration of Europeans are highly significant facts. True colonization, i.e. permanent European settlement, was scarcely attempted in Ceylon, and the focal point of European invasion and occupation was in each instance on the south-west coast—the Low-Country. Other than sporadic raids and occasional military posts neither Portuguese nor Dutch extended control or influence much beyond the rich cinnamon growing lowlands. With the British came extensive planting in the Kandyan highlands, but this brought neither true colonization nor extended Sinhalese contacts. The English planter usually stayed closely within an orbit that extended socially only a few miles from Russel Square, preferably toward the West End. His notable failure to enlist villagers in his labor force and consequently in the estate community, completed his isolation from things Ceylonese. The bodily penetration of the hills by the European brought with it minimum amounts of intercultural contact. The hill country villager, like his jungle brother, lived on in the Buddhist, familistic, magical, impoverished, feudal and caste structured milieu, except in so far as modifications came via secondary, usually governmental, channels.

The direct contacts of the Low-Country and of Jaffna were different, and they were vastly different from each other. The coastal

Southwest was the scene of intercultural contact in all its phases. Here the Sinhalese were brought into subordinate positions in government, here castes were integrated into service of the conqueror, and under the British, local feudal relationships diminished and contractual ones developed. Elsewhere colonial authorities little more than usurped the position of the feudal ruler, showing considerable regard for customary usage, but here the Sinhalese and migrant Jaffna Tamils were brought into the conquerors' van. Schools were established in the European tradition, and Christian conversion in one or another of its successive brands was a virtual prerequisite for cherished government jobs and favors. If the advantages of commerce and high office were long reserved for the European, the foundations were at least laid for a new indigenous class aristocracy. "Westernization" in language, dress, manner, and religion became both a passport for attainment, and a symbol of its achievement. However, even in the Low-Country, westernizing influences were sidetracked from the villages by the outmigration of those most influenced for urban and particularly governmental pursuits. Today, in the villages a few miles from the urban centers, English is not understood, trousers unworn, caste respected and devil dances sought after. Acculturation has meant departure from the village.

Further limitation of westernizing influences occurred through the creation in Portuguese and Dutch periods, of the purely urban, racially hybrid, "Burghers". The Burgher became the professional and white collar subaltern, almost fully acculturated, and as isolated from the "natives" as his teacher. Under British rule miscegenation was minor and so too were direct contacts between the rulers and any but their already acculturated subordinates.

Jaffna, far from the scene of lucrative exploitation, and as far from the seat of government, remained, except in a formal and military sense, almost fully outside the immediate influences of colonial governors. Largely by historic accident this peninsula did, however, become the seat of concentrated missionary activity. In consequence the educational facilities of Jaffna today are superior to any but the most urbanized areas to the south although the retention of Hinduism and its social correlates is exceedingly strong. Jaffna is the paradox of maximum cultural conservatism associated with the high and respected development of educational institutions. This is due to many factors, one of which is the out-migration of the English educated to areas of greater white collar opportunity.

Governmentally the web of conquest was felt more or less throughout the island, but in general a fair regard, if often ill-conceived, was displayed for customary law and institutions. Ceylon even today recognizes the traditional civil law of the Kandyan Sinhalese, the Tamil, and the Muslim, although modifications have been introduced. The Low-Country Sinhalese is guided by a European legal system. Through direct action none of the conquerors made studied effort to uproot the caste system or local feudal arrangements, let alone traditional family organization, supernaturalism, and the cynical might add, poverty.

If the majority of Ceylon villages did not become prosperous or much westernized under successive colonial powers neither did traditional values and way of life disintegrate, as in many areas of colonial exploitation. To imply however that the end of British rule in Ceylon left the island as it had been before European contact or in the same state as when Britain took possession, would be grossly misleading. The force of these observations is rather to indicate that circumstances tended to localize rather than to diffuse the acculturating effects of European control. It should be quite clear that Ceylon as a whole gained new concepts and services throughout her colonial history. For example, Father S. G. Perera has noted 363 obvious Portuguese words in common use in Sinhalese, a symptom of expanding horizons. There is no villager today unfamiliar with such concepts as those expressed in "Bus-eka", "Torch-eka" and "Car-eka". British administration left a moderately socialistic governmental organization with extensive, if frequently inadequate, branches operative throughout the island. Of great relevance here was the British establishment of a road system that is probably without parallel in any Southeast Asian country, and the maintenance of stable local government in a manner that was usually substantially harmonious with local tradition.

School systems, private and public, grew but the vernacular education available to the villager offered little to upset his traditions and way of life. Western medical service became available in varying degrees of adequacy but as a competitor and supplement to the magical and folk practices which have persisted. Public relief at times forestalled famine, but it shook neither family solidarity nor peasant distaste for wage labor. Communication channels criss-cross the island but their utilization is disproportionately by officials and the English educated; the villager's horizon is still in the village. Trade centers, or at least clusters of shops are accessible to practically every village,

but usually with little more urbanizing effect than the traditional village fair. Neither European rationalism nor Christianity has uprooted the powers of local deities, the efficacy of magic, the demands for caste endogamy, nor the feudal concepts of status and security. In the Low-Country, the nearness of cities, the greater prosperity, and the presence of Europeans and Europeanized "natives" brought sharp contrasts, and produced as well a villager himself somewhat more attuned to affairs of the market place and issues of national significance. Technologically even he has changed little. Generally throughout the island the peasantry is served by the organizational establishments of government and trade, but lives daily lives not greatly different from the seventeenth century, except for an increasing awareness of the potentials of the twentieth.

Whatever else may be clear, it is certain that colonial rule never tended to break down localism, ethnic communalism and caste solidarity. Ceylonese nationalism is a new concept unsupported in tradition and unsupported as well by the trends of colonialism. In regard to level of living there was possibly a rise in the colonial periods, but this had been no dominant concern of government. If the traditional order had subordinated level of living to preservation of the status quo, the colonial regimes subordinated it to mechanisms of economic exploitation, which, while not always deleterious to local interests, were not primarily guided by the criteria of maximizing Ceylonese welfare. Under ancient feudal rule an informed electorate was meaningless; until the later stages of British occupation, the same was essentially true. Even under colonial "self government" the educational system in the village was geared to the fundamentals of vernacular literacy. At the upper class urban level, education was guided by standards of a British intelligensia. Educational opportunity beyond the vernacular "literacy" level was a prerogative of the upper classes, i.e. those who had in some way identified themselves with the European or were of the landed aristocracy. Equality of opportunity economically had minimal meaning in an economy of caste and feudalism, and it had little more significance in an economy which except for government services and plantations was static. Centuries of European contact had its effects, but these effects either supported the orientations of traditional policy or at least failed to move Ceylon toward the goals that are now foremost. The contemporary transition in Ceylon must, if successful, shake the country's institutions and attitudes to the quick.

With present knowledge of resources and the status of world markets, it seems inevitable that the economic backbone of Ceylon's transition will lie in agrarian rather than in industrial programs; particularly in peasant food production. Ceylon, although predominantly a peasant country, imports more of her food requirements than she produces domestically; international exchange is acquired mainly through estate products. Limited in industrializing capacity and now having probably approximated her potential in the world market for estate produce, self sufficiency in food is both a nationalistic and a rational goal. If these observations are accurate, a relevant implication is the unlikelihood that Ceylon can support any major increase in the urban population ratio. Fundamentally Ceylon's fight for a new level of living lies in opening her great jungle land reserves and in raising the efficiency of established village agriculture. Were the Ceylonese population static, even the most elementary programs for agricultural expansion would increase the available food supply. Actually however, the level of living must be described as an equation between expanding population and expanding production, with only a minor share of the latter attributable to industrial growth.

Western public health techniques, and medical practice, are producing revolutionary effects upon the island's population growth. DDT spraying throughout the malarial regions has alone brought a phenomenally sharp decline in infant and adult mortality. There is further latitude for sensational success in sanitation programs. In spite of continued competition with folk practitioner and magical exorciser, the socialized western medical services are frequently taxed to capacity or beyond. As a Low-Country devil dancer observed, "Today I am getting only poor people, the rich are having better education and are going to western doctors." While this is not strictly true, the trend has been correctly assessed. It is apparent that all modern programs pertaining to health are in the immediate interest of a higher level of living and greater human welfare; it is equally apparent that they are producing a very rapid increase in the rate of population growth. There is no evidence of even a slight decline in the islands' high fertility rates and no reason to believe that increasing urbanity or other sterilizing influences will occasion change in the immediate future. For the time being a rising level of living would seem to rest upon Ceylon's ability to raise its productivity more rapidly than it is reducing its deaths. This is a large order indeed since western public health techniques and medical practice are being absorbed with much greater alacrity than western production technology.

The sensational economic effects of DDT have not, however, been limited to population increase. Through its use vast malarial jungles have been liberated for economic development. Jungle clearance and the settlement of peasant cultivators has become the major agricultural program in Ceylon. While these projects have been pursued with more political zeal than economic planning (Ceylon has not one agricultural economist) the fact none-the-less remains that thousands of landless peasants are being resettled on productive plots. But at best, transplantation of this necessarily minor proportion of the cultivators is no panacea, and in fact, it has probably been excessively costly. Without underestimating the necessity of jungle expansion the greater potential for national production, at least in the short run, probably lies in the established villages. Here, among the majority of the population, is an almost infinite scope for the introduction of scientific techniques and productive reforms in land management and farm organization.

Obstacles to the diffusion of scientific practices can today be weighed only by inference; farming has changed little with the centuries. A few improvements are sporadically urged by the government but as yet without adequate extension service organization and limited recognition of the role of either technical or promotional specialists. A rational and progressive agriculture will necessitate serious reforms in land tenure, size of holdings, production credit facilities, etc. throughout the village areas of Ceylon. The present organizational bases of village agriculture are positively stimulative to the retention of inefficient production. A governing élite which itself belongs heavily to the landed gentry, has been more alert to relief through jungle colonies than to fundamental reforms in the economic structure of existing villages.

Today the major technological innovations in rural Ceylon are those of modern medicine. Assuming what is by no means assured, that the basic reforms will be pressed, the susceptibility of villagers to new agricultural techniques is still an unknown element. In the most striking scientific achievement, malaria control, only passive acceptance was demanded of the villager himself. Worthy of note however was his easy acceptance of the spray, and ready reconciliation of it with the Buddhist precept of non-killing. The dramatic changes which have occurred in mortality trends are unlikely, however, to be paralleled by anything so spectacular in village production. Whether agricultural and modest industrial expansion can keep pace with sharply increasing population has not been properly assessed. One can

hazard a guess that, assuming a constant birth rate, the likelihood of a generally rising level of living over the next several decades is extremely doubtful. Given the present economic conditions and current mortality trends, population control seems an inescapable corollary to the main facets of the new social policy.

Simple diffusion of contraceptive knowledge and techniques presents a considerable problem. Far more serious than this is the incongruity of birth control in a society where parental prestige is measured by the numbers of children and the adequacies of dowries; where security is sought through the large family, and where preservation of the house name is no light responsibility. This is not to say that the villages will be immune to contraceptive practice, but its introduction presupposes or predicates a serious breach in the traditional familistic system. Still further changes in the family are of course implicit in matters of changing status concepts, the growth of secular motivations, and the rational organization of farm enterprises.*

Deeply rooted in the institutions of every society are its work motivations and conceptions of status. There is no opportunity here to discuss the relationships between such concepts as *dharma*, *karma* and *nirvana* and the motivated requirements of an enterprising society. Hinduism in northern Ceylon is at least as "orthodox" and enmeshed in caste, as in many parts of India. The same ideological problems which have baffled students of social change in India are present in Jaffna. The Buddhist Sinhalese, accepting the immutability of *karma* and the ideal of *nirvana*, worshipping Hindu deities, and rationalizing their caste organization to Hindu concepts, are nevertheless largely exempt from the rigid, sacred principles structuring Hindu society. The very mild caste system has more purely secular foundations, and evaluations upon various kinds of work are usually removed from thoughts of divine ordinance or fear of inferior re-birth. The vil-

* A common source of reluctance by villagers to enter colonization projects lies in its "defamilization" of life. The project draws households out of their highly inter-related, caste homogeneous, generationally revered villages and thrusts them into heterogeneous, impersonal, and enterprising communities where there is no room for proliferating generations to settle, claiming some share in the family lands. Many colonists try valiently to maintain their distant village connections through intermarriage, return visits etc. Thanks in part to strict regulation of land inheritance, it is unlikely that these projects will ever reproduce the structure of the old familistic villages. Intensive study in these localities might well reveal insights into the future of the peasant family under conditions of greater economic rationality.

lager's position at birth is explained through *karma*, but in that explanation he finds no fate binding him to that position. *Nirvana* is indeed an ideal goal, but he knows that a comfortable existence is pleasing and worth working for. In neither of these forces is there an ideological driving power toward secular achievement, but neither is there the necessarily stultifying effects frequently ascribed to them by some western ideologists. It is true that the basic metaphysical concepts lend little positive support to the material and timely endeavor required in changing Ceylon. However, there is no mistaking the mounting articulate complaints of villagers through government sponsored societies and through communist organizations. Students of pure ideologies have surely exaggerated the emasculating effects of these "spiritual values", not because these values in fact support material progress, but because actual life is far from a pure expression of them, and human imagination knows few bounds in the reconciliation of value systems to the urgency of actual situations.

Fully as serious as attitudes of "timelessness" and disinterest in worldly achievement, is the peculiar security-status questing of the secularly ambitious, both Sinhalese and Tamil. Youthful interest in vocation is primarily guided by the consideration of maximum security, with which is correlated maximum status. These requirements are found first of all in any civil service appointment, and barring that in any clerical government post. A feudal heritage, strongly influenced by the caste-like superiority of the colonial civil servant, and the continuing advantages attached to government service, has resulted in an appointment of the government clerk. No doubt the root drive toward security or status is attributable to more fundamental personality determinants; howsoever this may be, institutional supports for such motivation are not lacking in family, community and government itself. The fact that an increasing amount of the country's business is under government renders this condition less serious than might otherwise be the case. It does however reflect a notable lack of such economically dynamic motivations as were developed in the growth of protestantism and European capitalism. Concepts like "idleness", "honest toil", and "enterprise", have little or no ethical connotations.

Provision of equality in economic opportunity relies heavily upon expanding educational facilities and diminishment of regional, class, and caste inequities. Today, throughout most of Ceylon, educational institutions, however inadequate, are practically without caste discrimination. Even in Jaffna where Hindu caste concepts are rigor-

ously maintained, schools have been opened to all, thanks in no small part to Christian mission influence. Leadership recruitment in Sinhalese Ceylon may be covertly influenced by caste considerations, but outright discrimination in regard to professional or other high status occupations is minor. Here educational and economic achievement and high class position are not uncommon among urbanites of low caste. In Jaffna, personal status and achievement is closely limited by caste, and there remains the typically Hindu problem of practical discrimination even after educational opportunity is relatively equal. For southern Ceylon the issue is mainly that of a generally expanding economic opportunity with equalization of regional and class inequities in education.

As in many Asian countries the gulfs between the small upper and middle class and the large laboring and peasant populations are vast. Although the peasant retains a respected place in the status system, his opportunity to achieve a position of leadership in national or professional activities is as limited as for the urban cooley. Since English education is not readily accessible to the peasant, and usually not to the urban laborer, opportunity to move into white collar jobs is remote indeed. Vernacular education cannot provide the background for active participation in the work of government or the professions. Urbanward migration has been a double flow, the white collar and the cooley, the English educated and the non-English educated. The hiatus between these groups is practically insuperable, the one insulted at the suggestion of hand toil, the other wholly unequipped to change his status. While it is futile to expect an educational system alone to overcome these disparities, a rational democratic reorganization could at least make the gulfs between classes navigable by outstanding individuals.

The resolution of problems described here would reasonably work in the direction of a Ceylonese nationalism, through the diminuation of localism, familism, and caste, and with a broadened base of participation in national leadership. It is difficult, however, to see much evidence of nationalism today, in the sense of a dominion-wide group consciousness. Political independence has created a resurgence of nationalism, it is true, but mainly in the form of ethnic ambitions or "communalism". This is particularly evident for the Sinhalese, where nationalism has been grossly confused with the glorification of ethnic traditions, particularly in the form of religious revivalism. There is no symbol capable of arousing emotions in the hearts of both Sinhalese and Tamil, and tangible bonds between the two are few. Even

the potential scapegoat of a rising nationalism, the Indian estate laborer, is culturally one with the Ceylon Tamil. Although currently united in a movement for the Ceylonization of trade and employment, and, of course, participants in a common government, the roots of a national unity are embryonic.

The creation of a responsible electorate finds scant support in these same elements of localism and communalism, as well as in a generally low level of civic literacy. Outside the southwestern coastal fringe, village knowledge and concern with national and international affairs is trivial and vague. Suffrage is widely utilized but frequently upon abjectly low bases of decision in balloting. At this stage, Ceylon has three separate Marxian communist parties, one of which is Stalinist and undoubtedly Soviet linked. Communist persuasion at the peasant or worker level is not rooted in ideological matters, nor in fear of America or love of the Soviet; it is almost purely a protest movement doctrinally channelized by skillful leadership. The communization of the protest vote has been accomplished through parties lacking consistently formulated programs. Their success testifies to the vacuum existing in constructive, democratic, reform-opposition leadership. Strongest support for the left movements is along the urbanized southwest coast, where it is associated with articulate dissatisfactions more than with either political literacy or the most abject poverty. The average Sinhalese villager does not fear communism from any knowledge of world tensions or Soviet imperialism; he fears it for its threat to Buddhism.

Assuming the continuance of parliamentary self-government, Ceylon's great transition lies in the reformulation of a familistic, communalistic, and traditionalized society of status, into a more individualistic, rational, productive and nationally self-conscious democracy. Rapidly increasing population, among other factors, renders imperative the quick accomplishment of these changes. With the assistance of western nations it is possible that such a transition will come. If this is not effected, we may reasonably expect a reformulation of the issues and the conditions along Trotskyist or Stalinist lines.

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MATRILINEAL FAMILY BACKGROUND IN SOUTH INDIA

U. R. Ehrenfels

1. PLURALITY OF FAMILY CONCEPTS.

South Indian family structure is in part based on matrilineal inheritance and succession.¹ Even where this is not the case as especially in Brahmin and Brahmanical society, the matrilineal family-pattern left yet palpable marks, even in the now patrilineal family-structure. Such survivals can be found in the position of the mother's brother, puberty-rites for girls, apart from religious concepts, grouped round the figure of the mother-goddess.

These and similar other matrilineal survivals are generally less taken notice of than, and sometimes even mistaken for, remnants of the Joint Family structure. The two institutions are, however, different, though in South India no doubt inter-connected, phenomena. Both institutions are disintegrating in South India, the first giving way to a patrilineal (and patriarchal—) the latter to a small family structure; both of the 19th-century Western pattern. This comprises two generations only, whilst the Joint family consists of three or more generations, the youngest often comprising a number of siblings and first cousins², on either the matrilineal or patrilineal side, according to the general social system of the community concerned.

Joint families of a similar type are not unknown in the Western World—especially not among the Southern Slavs³ and other predominantly agricultural communities—but became increasingly rare, also in Europe, ever since the industrial revolution broke up family-estates of peasantry, gentry and nobility.

It is a well-known fact that particular attitudes are fostered in joint families and that they form a distinct background for character formation of the individual, by tending to create a family *esprit de corps*, experience in handling of younger children, the readiness to sacrifice personal—, to family—interests and, on the negative side, lack of individual enterprise, lack of independence in thought and action, often combined with lacking civic sense, as far as out-groups beyond the family limits are concerned.

Of an altogether different nature, however, are the attitudes which the matrilineal family structure favours;—irrespective of the fact

¹Ehrenfels (1941), pp. 36 seq., 71 seq.

²Desai (1936), pp. 10 seq.

³Vinski (1937).

whether this is the case in a matrilineal small,—or a matrilineal joint family. The most important features of the psychological trends, favoured in the matrilineal setting will be described presently. A word on the history, in time, and geographical extension, in space, of matrilineal social system in South India should, however, precede this description.

Matrilineal joint families used to predominate on the Malayalam-speaking West Coast of South India¹, just as the patrilineal joint family was well-established on the Tamil-speaking eastern section of the peninsula, ever since the patriarchal Brahmin ideology began to exert its influence; —also over the non-Brahmin communities. This process started at least two thousand years ago. We have reason to believe that before this, the matrilineal order predominated in larger areas, and more thoroughly than it did until the first world war, or even a few centuries back, on the West Coast.* Undoubtedly, surviving traditions of this order play their part even now.

Small, "single" families of patrilineal and, to a much lesser degree, also of matrilineal structure can still be found in the same South Indian area. The scarcity of small matrilineal families is mainly due, as will be explained later to the stigma of being "old-fashioned" which is attached to matriliney, as well as to the joint family system in South India, a concept which results in the destruction of the former, once the latter is abandoned, or broken up².

*I propounded this hypothesis at some length; comp: Ehrenfels (1941), pp. 58 seq., 171 seq. and saw later that it finds further support in matrilineal survivals among Tamil speaking isolated groups; comp.: Ehrenfels (1943), of the Indian mainland, as well as among the early Tamil immigrants into Northern Ceylon, who preserved (also linguistic) features of an earlier South Indian culture-pattern. The assumption of a local precedence of matriliney, as compared to patriliney in India has nothing to do with the older ideas of Morgan, MacLennan, Spencer, John Lubbock, and others who held that *all* human societies must at one time have passed through a *primitive*, evolutionary "Stage" of matriarchy. This theory is no more discussed here, because ethnography of the last half-century has shown that the truly primitive food gatherers are neither matrilineal, nor patrilineal, but generally follow the *bilateral* type of social organization. The matrilineal system, on the other hand appears to have developed as a product of a higher, plant-cultivating village civilization. comp.: Childe (1942), pp. 48, 49, etc., or even Chalcolithic City civilization; comp.: Ehrenfels (1941), pp. 171 seq., 185 seq.

¹Ehrenfels (1941), pp. 58, seq., 171, seq., where more references are given in the bibliography.

²This process is vividly illustrated by a number of detailed examples, given in a Ms. on *Nayar Kinship*, by Dr. Kathleen Gough-(Miller), who kindly permitted me to see her work before publication which, however, is hoped to be under way by the time this article may appear in print.

The survival chances for small ("single") matrilineal families are somewhat higher among the matrilineal Khasi of Assam in the eastern extension of Northern India.¹ Let us, however, now consider the most prominent trends of attitude and behavior which the matrilineal family situation favours.

2. FAVOURED TRENDS IN THE BASIC MATRILINEAL FAMILY PATTERN.

Inheritance of property, or succession in family—, clan—, and other titles, follows the line through the mother in matrilineal societies, just as it follows that through the father in patrilineal societies. In spite of this theoretical symmetry, the two types of family structure are far from complementary. A main factor of the difference between the actual working of the two systems, lies in the fact that, owing to the matrilocal residence of all, children live in close contact with their mother's brother(s), who has legal obligations to, and rights over them. A complementary figure (as e.g., the paternal aunt) does not, generally, play an equally important rôle in patrilineal families.

A second, but by no means less important point of difference between the two systems lies in the legal backing which the matrilineal order provides for the weaker family-members, as compared to the stronger ones. There is not only the person of the mother to be mentioned here as compared to the father, but also the position of sisters and daughters, as compared to brothers and sons, and, finally, the frequent preference given to the youngest (daughter or sometimes son) in the inheritance rule of the minorate.²

The net result of this matrilineal family-structure, as compared to the patrilineal pattern, may briefly be sub-summarized under the following main points:

(1) There is a distribution of authority, loyalty and responsibility to several individuals in the matrilineal family whilst concentration of power and authority in one person (the father) is the rule of the patrilineal system. Children in a matrilineal family learn to respect two important male elders (maternal uncle and father) apart from the mother, as important authorities, whilst the father of the patrilineal family tends to absorb all authoritative power in his person,—

¹P.T.O. Observations to this group, contained in the present review, are the results of two research-trips, carried out in 1949/50, with the financial support of the *Viking Fund, Inc.*, now: *Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc.*, New York, which awarded another grant for comparative studies among matrilineal societies of India under my direction, for which I wish to express grateful acknowledgement at this occasion.

²Cantlie (1934), pp. 22, 26, seq.

even if he is not a full-fledged Roman *pater familias* with all family-members *in manu*, — including the mother. This basic family situation provides the background for an attitude of compromise and adaptation to, or handling of, divided responsibility, whilst the patrilineal family-situation tends to foster centralized power and authoritarian rule.¹

(2) The physiologically and psychologically weaker members of the family (daughters, sisters, wives, mothers, as compared to sons, brothers, husbands, fathers and youngest as against elder siblings) are not only protected, legally, but enjoy certain preferential rights in inheritance of property and the transmission of family-name and tradition. The daughter in a matrilineal family has not only a secure economic and social position which, owing to the rule of matrilineal residence, she does not generally have to lose, or to give up, at marriage, but she is at the same time the vehicle of perpetuating the family-name and tradition. This situation presents the neglect of girls in education and often also nourishment and other care, which is such a frequently observed feature in many patrilineal societies. It is no doubt due to this that the Malayalam-speaking matrilineal communities of the West Coast in South India show the highest percentage of female literacy and that their girls were the first in India to take up University education and career.

Another factor to which Malinowski drew attention after his detailed study of the matrilineal Trobriand islanders, is the changed position of the Oedipus-situation, which is less pronounced opposite the maternal uncle, than the own father, unless the maternal uncle holds a very domineering position, which in most matrilineal societies he does not to the same extent as he does in South India. This again, appears to be due, to adaptation to patriarchal Brahmin concepts there.

¹This is true although, or perhaps rather *because*, one of the reasons why the matrilineal joint family system of the Malayalam-speaking West Coast in South India broke up, was the revolt of the average family-members against autocratic behaviour of their *karanavans*, or maternal uncles managing joint family property. The reasons for their autocratic behaviour have mainly to be found in two outside factors: (1) imitation of the extremely patriarchal behaviour-pattern of Nambudiri Brahmins, with whom the matrilineal communities of the area have become closely inter-connected since at least one and a half thousand years, and (2) the rapid population increase which more than doubled the matrilineal community within a period of half a century and naturally resulted in unprecedented overcrowding and dissatisfaction on the joint family estates; an important cause for the breaking up of the matrilineal joint family system to which Dr. Kathleen Gough-Miller has drawn attention, in a Ms. mentioned above.

The psychological and emotional ties between children and fathers are generally not adversely affected by the lack of legal formulation. The opposite may in many cases be said. But the ties between widowers and their children are often weakening, or cease to exist, after the mother's death, if the widower remarries, in which case his children will be staying in, and be looked after by, their mother's brother, — sisters, or other relatives.

3. CHANGE FROM MATRILINEAL TO PATRILINEAL PATTERNS.

The coincidence of recent changes from the joint family to small-family- and from the matrilineal to the patrilineal family structure suggests to many a necessary link between the two latter-named structures and "modern" economic developments generally. This assumed connection is based on the fallacy of identification between the joint family and the matrilineal organization to which reference has already been made previously.

Elements of basic social behaviour in a democratic order, such as readiness to compromise and legal protection of the psycho-physically weaker, are no doubt contained in the matrilineal family structure. Their fructification for the building up of a democratic society would appear to be possible, especially where a well-established tradition in political democracy is missing. The disintegration and, partly even disappearance, of powerful and by no means truly "primitive" matrilineal societies in all five continents of our planet, and during the last four to five thousand years, should not blind us to their intrinsic values nor their educational possibilities for a new society-structure at the present juncture. The great success of the patrilineal family- and patriarchal state-organizations which were first evolved among the nomadic herdsmen, in the Central Asiatic and east European *steppes*, was partly due to the overwhelming military power which the domestication of the horse lent to the organizations in the form of swift cavalry armies.¹ With their help alone was it possible to overrun the richer city-, and village- civilization of the fertile valleys and tropical, or subtropical plains, which were at least in part based on a matrilineal order of society.² The disappearance of most matrilineal survivals is, even now, due mainly to the direct, or indirect influence which the prestige-value of the patrilineal order and its erstwhile cavalry regiments exercised; — *not* to any innate superiority, nor less to a necessarily "primitive" character of the matrilineal social struc-

¹Turner (1941), Vol. 1., pp. 242 seq., 361 seq., 473.

²Childe, (1942) p. 59.

ture. Undoubtedly existing primitive features in many surviving, or extinct, matrilineal societies are as accessory and as little essential features of these societies, as the undoubtedly existing progressive and organisatory qualities of the Central Asiatic and east European horse-riding nomads were entirely confined to them.

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THE LANGUAGE HORIZON IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

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South-east Asia is on the move. In some ways the movement is a return to the past, yet it is forward looking; for, what belongs to the past is often what will belong to the future. But it is not altogether a return to the dead past so far as language is concerned. The language situations have altered and the languages themselves have developed, though the rate of development is likely to be speedier in the near future than it has been during the past few centuries. For one thing, those who wrote or speak now in the East are prepared, unlike their forebears, to discuss the claims of life and now; for another, prose literature has replaced poetry as the language of communication and even of creation.

The bursting of the West on Asia, has been the greatest event of modern times; it has undeniably altered the course of human history. We are too near this forceful if forced impact of Europe on the shores of Asia to record what waves have been set in motion, what footprints left on the sands of time. It is however not an image of Europe that is now born in the East; challenged by the West, it is Asia herself re-born. At the same time, it is not a mere revival, it is a renewal. Asia has truly absorbed Goethe's message: "What thou hast inherited from thy fathers, earn it anew if thou wouldst possess it."

The ideals that have spread over S. E. Asia in our time are those of Democracy, Nationalism and Humanity. The last named ideal is not foreign to the Asian mind, nor is the ideal of the Village Republic. But the Nation-State and Democracy on a nation-wide basis have been implanted from the West and they have to be actively nurtured if they are to survive and grow. More specifically, three ends have to be secured to preserve these great ideals. Firstly, every individual living in a democratic country should have the fullest chance for the development of his personality and enjoy equality of status and opportunity irrespective of his caste, creed, community or linguistic group. Secondly, every linguistic-cultural group should have the right to conserve and develop their language and culture enjoying from the state the same protection and patronage as other similar groups. Thirdly, especially in Asia with a background of communal and local rather than natural loyalties in the past, deliberate efforts should be made to foster the sentiment of One Nation. Further, along that same road, would lie One World.

These ideals have been stated because they have a direct bearing on language policy, both language of administration and language of education. That policy will in many countries have to recognize more than one official language and at the same time encourage citizens to become bi-lingual and tri-lingual. In the modern structure of populations it cannot be the same solution everywhere, nor a simple solution anywhere. To side-step difficulties by the simple device of a unilingual state or the unilingual school is to adopt a remedy worse than the disease. A situation of conflicting linguistic claims, unrecognized and unconceded, is a symptom of national disintegration. That, unhappily, is still the situation in many S. E. Asian lands.

Ceylon is South-east Asia writ small and the situation in this Island will illustrate both the confusion clouding the issues and the solution that may ultimately emerge. At the Census of 1946 the country had a population 6.6 million, 69% speaking Sinhalese and 29% speaking Tamil as their home language. The percentage of general literacy was 58 and of English literacy 6. Immediately after Ceylon became a British colony a century and a half ago, Governor North had suggested that the policy of the British Government in Ceylon should be to foster an English-educated élite "attached to their country by birth, and to England by education." These words anticipated Macaulay's famous minute of 1835: "We must do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions we govern: a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, words and intelligence; the uprooting of a vernacular was the extermination of a race." So from political considerations English became the language of government and the language of education. This was soon reinforced by a social one. The Ceylonese who assisted the ruling power soon adopted English as a symbol of their social separation from their countrymen—a phenomenon known in almost every court and high society in the past. That English was also the key to economic advantage gradually broadened the appeal of English and many vested interests to day seek to preserve the position of English. Pressure of democratic forces has however forced the Government to announce the acceptance of the principle of using Sinhalese and Tamil as official languages. There is still confused speculation as to when this will be implemented and in what manner.

Even when that day comes, when English has ceased to be the official language, we shall still need English. English will stay as an ally of the national languages, not as their usurper. We need a language or languages that will keep this country in touch with world

advances in thought and with international affairs. We want our teachers to read modern books on education, our research workers to read scientific journals in other languages, our politicians and diplomats to follow international political developments and our higher administrators and professional men to gain from experience elsewhere. We must bear in mind too that as English will remain for some time as a substantial medium of University education a reasonable command of English will be necessary for university entrants. All this means that those who study English must study it to some purpose. The more men and women who can study English in this manner the better; but obviously it will be the few, not the many. Asian countries would do well to follow the guidance of Japan in this regard. Here is a country which sought progress by using foreign languages for specialized needs, especially for her international scientific contacts, while using her own language for nearly all internal purposes, including university education and scientific research. The returned Japanese scholar, scientist or diplomat spoke to his people in their own language and the remotest village shared in the phenomenal advance made by the country in but two generations.

We arrive at the same conclusion, that English will be studied by a limited number of people when we examine its claims to study from the point of view of the individual learner. If he has linguistic ability he can study it to the point where (i) it will serve him as medium for advanced studies in specialized fields, (ii) it will yield him pleasure and inspiration as literature, (iii) it will serve as mental training when he studies language by observing the relationship between the foreign language and his own language in structure, vocabulary and ideas. In fact no student of language can afford to confine himself to one or even two languages. As Goethe remarked, "he who is ignorant of foreign languages knows nothing of his own." But when we remember that aptitude for language is not universal even among pupils of superior intelligence, we are led to the conclusion that English must be studied at the right stage, in the right manner and by the right person. As H. N. Brailsford has warned, the King-Emperor's English is doomed in Asia; but this other English self-chosen by Asians for their own purposes may possibly flourish for long.

Nor, in S. E. Asia, can we afford to stop even at English. Indeed much of modern knowledge may have to be made available to Asian scholars and scientists through translations from foreign languages into English. That is the task assigned by U.N.E.S.C.O., to A. L.

Gardiner, specialist in technical translations now working at the scientific and technical documentation centre, New Delhi. "As half of the literature which covers all fields of science is not published in English, it is important that as much of it as possible should be made available in that language." But, really, we cannot kick against our geography. What the free Nations of Asia need is a plenitude of persons conversant with the principal languages of Asia and Europe who will keep their countries in contact with one another and with the rest of this shrunk world. One World, but many nations; international understanding, but through the medium of many languages. The short road is not always the shortest!

To return to the problem of two national languages in Ceylon, the government's policy with regard to the place of Sinhalese and Tamil in state and school will be the most fateful for the future of the country. Any shortsighted policy of 'linguistic separation' will break the nation. On the other hand, the geographical and social interspersing of the two languages, as well as the bilingual tradition of our earlier history, make Sinhalese-Tamil bilingualism the most natural thing for us. In the context of modern democracy the very arguments that favour the use of the people's language in administration compel the use of the two national languages on an equal basis in every province and district. It would ensure equal rights for all citizens in civil, political and economic matters and equal opportunities of paid and honorary public service. From the point of view of the two sister languages themselves their use side by side will lead, as it did in ages past, to their mutual enrichment in ideas and vocabulary, idiom and modification of structural forms. But cultural gains apart, the grave need at this turning point in our history is the creation of a common nationhood. The political unity and rule of law imposed from above by the British administrators will not last forever unless, meanwhile, a psychological unity were nursed into existence from below. The nation should be a group mind consisting of common experiences commonly remembered and with a common future envisaged.

Dr. G. E. Malherbe, the Natal Vice-Chancellor's view, that the bilingual school is "the only sure means of achieving integration of the two sections of the community and of building a united, South African-conscious people" applies to all bilingual countries, including Ceylon. To quote from his *Bilingual School*: "First, we should be able to communicate with each other without strain; and that is only possible if we speak each other's languages. —We should create in the school an atmosphere in which the two traditions are looked on not

as hostile and incompatible, but as complementary to one another." Second, as far as possible children of both linguistic groups should be educated in common schools, using the 'parallel medium' or 'dual medium'. It is simply true to say that children learn each other best through each other's language and learn each other's language best through each other.

A world language then for a limited number of people for promoting world contact; the other national language for a large number of people for promoting communication within the nation. Both these, however, as languages of communication, as educational auxiliaries—for those who can profit by them. But for everyone, as the language of creation and the basic language of his education, his mother tongue—the language of his home and native culture. As H. N. Brailsford says: "One language only holds the key to our emotions; one language only conveys to us, surely and instinctively, the subtler overtones of suggestion which its words possess. That is the language that we used at our mother's knee: the language of our first thoughts and our first prayers and our first spontaneous outbursts of joy or grief. To make any other the vehicle of education is not merely to add immeasurably to the pupil's labours: it is to lame his mind in its freedom of movement."

India, even more than the U.S.S.R., is the multilingual country of the World. Apart from hundreds of minor speeches and dialects, there are fourteen major languages recognized as Regional Languages in the Constitution of India. Of these, Hindi, spoken or understood by half of India's 350 million population and after Northern Chinese and English, the world's most largely spoken language, is the official language of the Indian Union; the other Regional languages are recognized as State languages, some States indeed using more than one language. English, which succeeded Persian as the court language, will continue as the federal language for fifteen years from the inauguration of the Republic and may continue thereafter for any purposes specified by the Indian Parliament. What is the implication of this policy for education? The Radhakrishnan Commission (1949) put it as follows: "The Federal language will be used for all Federal activities — cultural, educational and administrative. The regional languages will occupy a similar position in the provinces and units of the Federation. But in order to enable every region and unit of India to take its proper share in the Federation activities, and to provide interprovincial understanding and solidarity, educated India

has to make up its mind to be bilingual, and pupils at the higher secondary and university stages will have to know three languages. Every boy and girl must obviously know the regional language, at the same time he should be acquainted with the Federal language, and should acquire the ability to read books in English." With regard to technical terms, the same Report suggested "that international technical and scientific terminology be adopted, the borrowed words be properly assimilated, their pronunciation be adapted to the phonetic system of the Indian language and their spelling fixed in accordance with the sound symbols of Indian scripts."

Pakistan has adopted Urdu as the national language of her seventy million people. Urdu is the Islamic form of Hindi; in its literary form it has a large Arabic and Persian admixture and its script is totally different from the Devanagari script of Hindi and other North Indian languages. English continues for the time being side by side with Urdu, but the Urdu policy has not pleased other linguistic groups in Pakistan. The most deep-seated opposition comes from Eastern Pakistan where the population is deeply attached to Bengalee, one of the most highly developed languages on the Indian sub-continent, with a rich modern literature, indeed one of the World's major languages spoken altogether by 55 million people.

Burma has a smaller population (17 million) and one principal language — Burmese — which has been made the medium of education and administration. As in India and Pakistan, English survives very much at the university level, though in varying degrees in different institutions.

Thailand with a population of about the same size has only one linguistic minority — the immigrant Chinese who, like Chinese everywhere, speak Chinese, eat Chinese, live Chinese and show little sign of assimilation. To prevent future trouble the Government has closed Chinese schools and insists on the exclusive use of the Thai language for all purposes. But American influence is spreading and with that the English language.

The Philippines, with a slightly larger population has in recent times seen the successful replacement of Spanish by English though the cultural hegemony is still divided half and half between the Catholic Church and the United States. Not less interesting is the revival of long neglected native dialects.

The new Republic of Indonesia with her population of seventy millions has two special problems — one, that of eliminating the hitherto dominant Dutch language without losing the culture and

progress she has owed to the Dutch connection, and the other, that of trying to assimilate the Chinese element in her population. A number of leading Indonesian men and women have been Holland-educated but they desire to change over to English as their main foreign language because it has a wider world currency than Dutch. The most remarkable decision of the Indonesian authorities is that to integrate Javanese, Malay and other speeches prevalent in these widely strewn islands into a vigorous new Indonesian language — the official language of the Republic. While the older and bigger University of Indonesia still uses Dutch, the new University of Gadjah Mada in the nationalist centre of Djokjakarta has taken the bold step of adopting the Indonesian medium in instruction, though staff and students are forced to consult text-books in Dutch and English. The fact that a Latin script is already in use for the Indonesian language makes it possible both for Indonesian students to read books in English and Dutch, after they have had some introduction to those languages, and for Dutch professors to pick up Indonesian fairly quickly.

The last country included in our survey and the least in point of population is Malaya. The Malays form nearly half the population, but the Chinese are little less numerous than the Malays. Indians form a small minority and Eurasians a still smaller one. The official English language has signally failed to unify the country or to give the conservative Malays their right place in the economy of their country. The tell-tale distribution of enrollment in the University of Malaya should be noted: Chinese 66%; Indians (including Ceylonese) 22%; Malays 9%; others 3%. Recognition of the Malay language as the Malayan *lingua franca* and main official language must form part of any just settlement in that country.

Nowhere then has a perfect solution been found to this problem of languages. Much less can we say what will be the picture fifty years hence in South-east Asia. We can no more than see specks on the horizon. "Everyman in his own tongue, wherein he was born"; that is about the only certain prediction. Besides their own native one, what other will they speak of their country's tongues? What international language will they speak or read around the Indian Ocean—English, French, Chinese, Hindi? Or, will it be American?

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NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN EASTERN EDUCATION

K. G. Saiyadain

It is an obvious truism to say that Education is powerfully influenced by its socio-economic and politico-cultural environment. It is, however, worthwhile to repeat this fact because, in dealing with problems at the international level, we are often apt to ignore it and to assume that a particular pattern which appeals to us and is applicable to our own conditions will also find favor with others—or at least it should do so! To my mind, the proper approach in all international and even in inter-group relationships should be to recognize frankly the differences that do exist and then seek to reconcile them within a broader and more comprehensive pattern.

Let us take this question of the incidence of the forces of nationalism and internationalism on Education in the East. Many leading thinkers in the East and the West have pointed out that there is no such thing today as the East, as a psychological entity in clear contrast to the West as another such entity. This truth was re-affirmed with special force at the East-West Symposium which was recently held in New Delhi under the joint auspices of the Unesco and the Government of India on the subject of the *Concept of Man and the Philosophy of his Education in the East and West*. Modern movements of thought as well as technological developments and forces have cut across these boundaries and brought in their train new affiliations as well as antagonisms which are not based so much on geography as on ideological and technological forces. So, when I speak of "Education in the East", I cannot claim to be discussing a basically common and uniform concept of Education. There is, however, no doubt that, during the last one hundred years or so, certain political and economic conditions have prevailed in many of the countries of this region which educationists, administrators, politicians and all those who seek to shape national destinies must take into serious account. The outstanding feature of this century-old situation has been the fact that these countries were, generally speaking, in a stage of arrested development. They had lost their national freedom and had come under the political or economic domination of the western nations which had in the meanwhile developed industrially and built up their aggressive imperialisms. The greater part of the present century, particularly the last two of three decades, has been a period of slow but increasingly successful struggle against these imperialisms. Within the memory of the present generation, country after country has achieved its political liberation and there can be no doubt

that within the next few years the "pus-pockets" of *political* imperialism that remain will also be liberated. I have stressed the word 'political' in the preceding sentence because I realize that there are other forms of imperialisms, particularly the economic, which are still entrenched in these countries and are, in fact, growing in range and power in some of them. These may take longer to be dislodged because they are linked up with forces of economic exploitation in which national and international interests are apt to become linked up and buttress one another.

In this political struggle in the various countries of Asia—in which India has played the role of a pioneer under the leadership of that unique figure of modern History, Mahatma Gandhi — the most important sentiment that was brought into play was the sentiment of nationalism. It was urged, quite rightly, by the leaders of the struggle that, unless the people threw off the foreign yoke, they will neither be able to make material progress nor evolve the inner richness of their national self, which finds characteristic self-expression in painting, music, literature, crafts and all the other "arts of peace". The political domination of the West stood in the way of realizing these cherished objectives and, at least to the nations concerned, it seemed at the time the only substantial obstacle. Thus a resurgent nationalism and an anti-imperialistic outlook came to be the dominating mood of these hundreds of millions of people, openly inspiring their political struggle and also affecting to some extent the educational trends. The effect in the educational field was either indirect or limited to certain 'national' institutions because the direction and control of educational policy and curricula remained in the hands of the foreign Governments till political freedom was actually achieved. The part played by students in the political struggle in India, Indonesia and Burma, and in the movements that are going on today in some of the Middle Eastern countries, is a clear indication of how powerful these trends have been.

How is the pattern of Eastern education to develop in the near future *vis-a-vis* the movement for better international understanding? I feel that the reply to this question depends as much on the policies and attitudes of the eastern nations as on the political and economic policies and attitudes of the western nations. These latter must have the wisdom to realize that imperialism is a dead or dying concept which they should no longer cherish and intrigue for, that the eastern peoples have the right to work out their destinies in their own ways, that the notions of racial superiority will not be tolerated any longer and that where they persist, as in South Africa or in America, they

are likely to create an explosive situation which is good for none of the parties concerned. If they can come to this realization and are sincerely prepared to withdraw from the position they had taken up in the nineteenth century that the East only offered fruitful field for exploitation and to establish their new relationship with the East on a basis of cooperation and equality, there is no reason why nationalism in the East should develop on lines which are antagonistic to the spirit of internationalism. If, on the other hand, this nationalism is resisted by the West and equality and cooperation based on equality are denied, there is reason to apprehend that East-West tension on a racial and geographical basis will grow and complicate the international situation irreparably. This will naturally affect educational policies more directly and powerfully than in the past because the Governments of these countries are now in a position to formulate their educational policies toward certain definite ends.

Given the external conditions that I have stipulated—and I realize that they are by no means easy to ensure!—there are certain circumstances which favour the development of Eastern Education on lines calculated to strengthen international understanding and peace. In the first place, speaking generally, none of these countries — including, I believe, Japan now — have any aggressive or imperialistic designs or ambitions against any other countries. They are not out to conquer and exploit Africa, Europe or America! They have been through a long period of political and economic exploitation or wars and have to build up their undeveloped or shattered economy for which peace is essential. In their own interest, therefore, they would welcome a long period of peace in which they can devote themselves wholly to their programmes of reconstruction and development. In this work they would need — and, in fact, welcome — the technical and financial assistance of the more advanced Western nations, provided, to use a current phrase “there are no political strings attached to it”. Again, — if I may say so, without any implied sense of “Eastern superiority” — the whole trend of religious and political teaching and philosophy in the East has been towards peace and understanding, towards a policy of “live and let live”. It is not entirely an accident that a man like Gandhiji should have been born in India and that two of the most important thinkers and poets of modern India should have been Tagore and Iqbal, both of whom had a global vision and an essentially humanistic approach to all problems. Also, in the development of nationalism not only in India but the whole of the East, Jawaharlal Nehru has played a part whose full significance has not, I am afraid, been realized yet

by many of his critics outside. It is he who has been responsible from the outset for placing the Indian national struggle in its proper international context and this example has influenced the development of nationalism in other countries to varying degrees. Even during the most bitter days of the Indian struggle, Gandhiji's pacific approach and Jawaharlal Nehru's international approach kept it remarkably free from chauvinism and the fight against British imperialism never degenerated into a hatred or dislike for the British people. The actual transfer of power took place under conditions which established, really for the first time, a feeling of general cordiality between India and the United Kingdom so that, so far as India is concerned, she starts her post-freedom pilgrimage to a fuller life without any international animosities. In the case of the only nation against which such a sentiment may have persisted, it was luckily liquidated in a grand finale of goodwill.

All this goes to show that in Eastern Education the situation is favourable for the development of an outlook of international understanding and cooperation. But I must point out that this will *not* follow automatically. Mere absence of ill will is not enough. In these days of acute tensions and conflicts and ideological wars, there is need for cultivating a *positive mind* which is wedded to peace and internationalism and regards appreciation of differences as more important than steam-rolling them. In most of these countries, international contacts on the political level are comparatively recent, because they were formerly confined or channelled through their foreign governments. Also, it would not be right to claim that the absence of international ill will is entirely due to higher standards of political intelligence or morality. They are due, at least in part, to preoccupation with immediate national issues, to a certain measure of indifference to broader problems and the fact that these countries have comparatively few vested interests at the international level. In this connection, reference may usefully be made to a project that has been recently undertaken by the Indian National Commission at the instance of the Unesco to study the History textbooks taught in secondary schools and intermediate colleges. The study was undertaken from the point of view of eliminating the subject matter likely to be prejudicial to the promotion of international understanding and goodwill. The examination of a number of textbooks revealed that while there was little in them which was likely to provoke any international misunderstanding, there *was* lack of well-thought out material which could directly educate students into understanding international problems in their proper setting and help to build defences of peace in their minds. On the other hand, there was plenty of material likely

to create inter-group and inter-communal tensions and to provoke a sense of national inferiority *vis-a-vis* the ruling race. Partly as a result of ignorance or an ill-educated historical sense and partly as a matter of deliberate policy, the British historians and authors who wrote history books for schools and colleges high-lighted communal differences, particularly anything which could be given the colour of Hindu-Muslim tensions. They also went out of their way to convey the impression that, by and large, the pre-British period was one of darkness, pierced here and there by a few unexpected streaks of light, and it was only the British rule which had brought the blessings of peace and order and just administration with it. It is difficult to imagine a greater and educationally more harmful travesty of truth. An educational approach, as distinct from a biased political approach, would have tended, at least at the school level, to *play down* instead of aggressively *playing up* differences and conflicts. But for many decades, British historians and their Indian imitators who wanted to write "acceptable" books went on presenting Indian History in untruthful or misleading colors and I believe in other countries of region, similarly circumstanced, the position is no different. I have mentioned this fact in some detail because it brings out vividly the relationship of nationalism and internationalism in Eastern Education. In such a situation it is impossible to disentangle them from each other and, therefore, in the interest of proper international understanding itself, it is necessary to set right such injustices at the national level, and to present history more sympathetically and fair-mindedly. I am not suggesting a post-mortem on the past—at least at the stage of school education—because it might provoke an avoidable bitterness. But I *would* like to lay a good deal of emphasis on a re-writing of history books in such a way as to eliminate inter-group tensions, to promote a sense of national solidarity and to place it in its proper international context. No nation sorely divided against itself can become a healthy and cooperative unit of the international community and nothing should be done either internally or externally to perpetuate such differences.

To sum up, from my point of view, international understanding is basically a problem of inter-national *justice*. If the East is treated with fairness, both politically and economically, I see no reason why its resurgent nationalism or national education should run counter to the forces making for peace and understanding. If it is not so treated, there is every danger of this nationalism becoming aggressive and bitter and sweeping education out of its path of peace and into its irresistible train.

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THE EDUCATION OF BACKWARD PEOPLES

D. B. Ellapola and T. L. Green

While the societies of S. E. Asia as a whole are backward in relation to the technological cultures of the West it must not be overlooked that these Asian societies are themselves at different cultural levels. Many who live in Bombay, Colombo, Singapore and such cities are able to enjoy a highly westernized life, or to preserve their Eastern modes of living while exploiting Western technology. At the other extreme are the peoples who, living in areas little touched by westernization, continue to follow modes of life which have remained almost unchanged from a quite remote past. Such, for example, are the Vedda of Ceylon and the hill tribes of Bihar, Orissa and elsewhere in India. The first named number but a few, 2,361 at the 1946 Census (1), but the aboriginals of India are estimated to number 25 millions of whom 5 million have had no contact with civilization (2). Elsewhere, though on a smaller scale perhaps, as in New Guinea, Assam, etc., there are similar groups of peoples living a life almost untouched, in a direct sense, by western influences. Between these two extremes are many in rural areas who are just coming under the influence of educational provisions, social welfare work, schemes of rural development, and the like, which they have previously lacked because of remoteness or neglect—as in many parts of the Kandyan hill regions of Central Ceylon (3).

A characteristic feature, well seen in India and Ceylon, which results from the assumption of political independence, is a new concern about the welfare of all such backward groups.

Prominent in the schemes for the rehabilitation or social advancement of these peoples are proposals regarding education. While education must rank as one of the most powerful agents in social engineering it can only be effective when its ends are clearly determined and when suitable means have been devised. In brief, what sort of education should be offered to backward peoples in S. E. Asia?

It is an unfortunate fact that education in the East has tended to suffer from two major defects: there has been too little of it, and it has been of the wrong kind. There has been a tendency to take western models and to apply them through a highly centralized control, so that widespread over India and Ceylon, for example, one finds an education which is unpractical, formal and abstract. In addition to the fact that it is a town centered education offered to rural dwellers it has the further defect that it reflects western urban conditions.

If the appropriateness of such an education can be questioned in the West (as it has been (4) how much more need is there to be critical of it in the East. In another paper in this issue (see page 382) it is shown that, in Ceylon, this kind of education, coupled with other social factors, results in competition for white collar jobs and the neglect of the basic needs of production. In India, where an unsuitable education led to a vast body of unemployed university graduates this, and related social phenomena, led to the Wardha Scheme of Basic Education. In Ceylon the Wardha Scheme does not find ready acceptance (5) but there is evidence of an attempt to develop a form of education of practical type which might ultimately meet rural needs (6).

In many regions of the world UNESCO has sponsored experiments in Fundamental Education, as in the Marbial Valley, at Minneriya in Ceylon, and in various centres in India. Although some of this work has a fairly long history it is unfortunately still true that evaluation studies are inadequate. Indeed, only comparatively recently has this side of the work received serious attention. Without such studies the question of deciding whether similar methods can be used with even less advanced peoples becomes difficult. But at least it is possible to lay down certain criteria which would seem to be relevant and important. Among these the following are worthy of notice:—

1. *Social organization should be undisturbed.*

Existing social organization has been achieved through a long period of social development and the danger in which many "primitive" people find themselves results from the disintegration of their institutions, the failure to achieve alternative social structures and the impossibility of rapid assimilation into the culture patterns of other societies. It is not suggested that primitive social organizations must be preserved. The important point is that the unavoidable changes which must come upon them should be as slow as possible in order to allow for the cultural substitutions which are an essential basis of success.

To gain acceptance for this point it may be wise to point out that the social organization of a primitive group is not necessarily devoid of good features. This is well seen, for example, in the matrilineal societies of S. India which, as Professor Ehrenfels shows in this issue (see page 360) are changing to patrilineal structure. The matrilineal societies had many good qualities which derived from the status of women and it is an unfortunate fact that many of these qualities

are today being abandoned merely because they are traditional. In the patrilineal societies which are developing in many parts of S. E. Asia women occupy a very subordinate position. One result is that the general level of social education falls because female education is reduced in male dominated societies — and to educate a girl usually means to educate a future family.

It must at once be admitted that this criterion is not easy to fulfill; in one sense it cannot be fulfilled because social change is a concomitant of education. The point may however be illustrated in greater detail by referring to caste. In a democratic world with egalitarian ideals caste is anomalous because it prevents social mobility. Any attempt to suddenly break down caste might, however, disrupt the economic basis of communal life because many productive functions and social services depend on caste.

2. *Education must be centered in local conditions.*

Obvious as this may appear there is still a danger that centralized administrative authority may develop a single rural education scheme and attempt to apply it in varying conditions. A locally centered educational scheme must relate to many variants — cultural organization, economic resources and procedures, traditions — all are relevant. If these are ignored the content of education is likely to be practically meaningless, and thus its only outcome is likely to be acceleration of the drift from the natural habitat — most probably to urban areas where the individual becomes a cultural misfit.

3. *Education must be concerned with the problems of living.*

In the historical development of education there has come about a gradual replacement of the concrete with the abstract. To carry the resulting type of education to a backward people, even though it is concerned with their local conditions, is to ignore the basic need that education shall relate to life processes. And in primitive societies, despite the existence of myth and magic, these are fundamentally practical problems. Education for such people must be based in, and lead towards improvements in food and health, for on these better standards of living depend. To see education merely as a drive for literacy, important though that is, is to be blind to the real problem.

4. *Education must be practical.*

Primitive peoples live in close contact with the problems of primary education. For them work means doing a job in a chena, field or at the fish traps. It does not mean sitting at a desk dealing with counters

and symbols. The education we offer must be in the same practical spirit and be concerned with the same practical problems.

A particular danger here is that the outside expert, however simple in his methods of approach and the techniques he wants to introduce, may yet be putting forward methods which are uneconomic. In Ceylon, to take an example, the general level of health would go up if everyone boiled and filtered water used for drinking. Apart from ignorance and custom there is an economic limiting factor here. The wood used for fuel is costly for those in many areas and often difficult to obtain elsewhere. A commercial filter would be prohibitive in price. The start then must be made along other lines, by improving fire places so that thermal efficiency is greater and by using simple clay pots with sand and ash for filters.

Although the fulfillment of these conditions may appear fairly straight forward it is not so in practice. Among the difficulties involved the following might be mentioned—

- a. Lack of sufficient knowledge of the ways of life, status and value systems of many of the aboriginal peoples of S. E. Asia. It is not suggested that no anthropological studies exist, what is meant is that there are insufficient studies of the social anthropology of this great area.
- b. Lack of social anthropologists and educators with a training in social anthropology, particularly with regard to the processes of socialization.
- c. The fact that in many regions people of the kinds we are concerned with are looked down upon by others—they are in fact often the depressed or casteless. While the attitudes which lead to this situation continue to exist it is difficult to develop sympathy with their condition.
- d. The difficulty of bringing about an economic relationship between a money society and one resting upon barter or using services other than tokens for exchange. It is here that attempts to encourage production often fail — no way of selling the goods produced can be found. Also it must be noticed that this is increased because westernization has created an urge towards goods of western origin.
- e. The fact that in seeking to improve the lot of backward peoples we are often asking them not merely to adopt a new technique, or a slightly modified technique, but to move out of one culture pattern into another. The more sophisticated pattern

of life we carry to them has been acquired during a long social evolution — it is an act of faith or folly to expect others to tread the same path, not in years, but in days.

Finally it is necessary to refer to the question of teaching procedures. Despite what has been achieved, under certain conditions, with mass instruction media, notably the motion picture film, there are reasons for choosing simpler methods first. It is true that in many parts of S. E. Asia social education, with a film basis, is being tried on a large scale. There have been few, if any evaluation studies of the results. It does not require elaborate study however to disclose that, in the majority of cases, the films used have been unsuitable because they were western in origin and that their presentation was too abstract and too quick. If they do have a result, it is usually that of making people anxious to leave their district to live in the more favored towns shown on the screen. The film undoubtedly has a place in this work, but it is a second or third place. Social education among aboriginal peoples is essentially a process based in human inter-relations carried out over a long period of time.

In ideal conditions a team of workers, expert in the different fields (e.g. health, agriculture, language, etc.) undertakes a long term job. They must come with some training in social anthropology, they should have an anthropologist on the team, and they should start to understand the people among whom they propose to work. This building up of a mutual trust and understanding is essential, and is the very foundation of success. When they know the people then they can set out to get the people to define their own wants; finally, by group discussion they can set about planning to meet these wants. Without mutual understanding and trust, and without co-operation in effort, education will merely be something which is imposed from without instead of developed from within.

There remains an ultimate — or rather a first problem — should we attempt to take education to these people? To those with some contact with modern life the answer is yes — with the safeguards we have suggested. The real aboriginals present a different problem. Verrier Elwin, who has lived for over twelve years among the Gond peoples of Central Provinces, India, makes a plain statement (2) — "It is of little use to say that we should give the blessings of civilization to the remotest aboriginals when we cannot give it to the workers in our great cities or to the peasants in accessible areas in the plains... casual benefits only destroy and degrade; it needs a lifetime of love and toil to achieve permanent advance.... The essential

thing is not to "uplift" them into a social and economic sphere to which they cannot adopt themselves, but to restore to them the liberties of their own country side."

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VOCATIONAL PROBLEMS IN EDUCATION IN S. E. ASIA

T. L. Green

INTRODUCTION

Inherent in most, if not all, definitions of the purpose of education is a vocational aim. In its least defined form it is implicit in such vague expressions as "education for living", but in the minds of most individuals in the East is a clear realization that education is the key to status—and status is very largely defined in terms of occupation. While this position may, at first sight, appear to differ but little from conditions in the West, in U.K. and U.S.A. for example, there are factors operative which, in fact, make the position fundamentally different. Not only do these factors differentiate between East and West, especially with regard to vocational motivation, but they carry implications which are important to the West—indeed to the world. It is the purpose of this review to attempt some analysis of the situation and to offer some observations upon its implications. The difficulties of so doing come not only from the magnitude of the subject, the diversity of its aspects and the necessarily limited experience of a single observer, but also from the fact very little research has been done in this field. These, and other limiting factors, make it necessary to restrict attention to Ceylon. Conditions in Ceylon however are undoubtedly similar to those of India and probably highly indicative of those in many other parts of S. E. Asia.

MOTIVATIONS IN VOCATIONAL AMBITIONS IN THE WEST

Studies, which are numerous and too well known to need individual citation, have shown that western youth is motivated in the choice of career by many factors. For comparison with the situation in the East it is convenient to mention some of the more important of these factors here. Economic reward, social prestige, security of tenure, conditions of working, duration of vocation, the appeal of personal power—all are well known. Others too are operative, such as a highly developed interest (e.g. in science) the opportunity to continue a particular interest (e.g. the teacher who continues his study of local history), the liking for creative opportunity and that sense of vocational dedication which has led many to serve society. A further factor is also operative, though it functions differently at different social levels. For example, in upper class society in England there are families where tradition decrees continuance in a particular vocation, hence there are "military" "legal" or "diplomatic" families. In lower class society (more markedly in the middle and upper levels thereof) there is a well marked ambition among fathers to break the

familial occupational history so that many a man makes sacrifices in order to give to his son "a better chance in life" than he had.

VOCATIONAL PATTERNS IN CEYLON

Ceylon is primarily a land of villages with the bulk of the population engaged in rural activities. The plantation economy, based on tea, rubber and coconut calls for a labour force which is primarily low level. Industrialization, though increasing, is still upon a small scale. In brief occupational opportunities in Ceylon are restricted in variety and markedly different from those of the West.

The position can perhaps be best summarized by using data from the most recent Census Report (1) as shown below in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Relative distribution of gainfully employed population.

<i>Occupational group.</i>	<i>% of gainfully employed.</i>
A. Production	— 64
B. Distribution	— 21
C. Services	— 15

Avenues of occupation are again limited by the fact that the Government is the largest employer and almost the only one offering "a living wage." Private enterprises are small in number and extent and, though the principals do well financially there are restricted chances of advancement for the vast majority of employees. Much of the mercantile business is in non-Ceylonese hands, especially it is controlled by European (chiefly British) and Indian interests.

From the view point of the economist the Ceylonese exhibit certain marked attitudes to the problems of economic expansion. In general it may be said that they exhibit a general unwillingness to accept long-term reasonable business risks but are over ready to accept short term risks which by normal financial estimate, can only be called gambles. This call for quick profit returns is leading to a dangerous situation, particularly in plantation economics, where, in the interests of the quick return estates are broken up, sold and operated in ways which must ultimately have serious consequences because all long-term needs (such as investment for improvement) tend to be neglected. In brief, capital in Ceylon is handled in terms of returns which are as large and as quick as possible.

MOTIVATIONS OF VOCATIONAL AMBITIONS IN CEYLON

Vocational ambitions in Ceylon strongly reflect the vocational patterns described above and vocational motivations reflect not only vocational opportunity but certain value-systems which take their origin from the structure of society. Two of these, caste and dowry, are of considerable significance.

Caste generates an hierarchic structure whereby some, such as the potter and other manual workers occupy a low social status while others such as the farmer enjoy a high social status. The dowry system, the concomitant of the arranged marriage, places a premium on those vocations which rate high in prestige, competition for which inevitably becomes severe. The relationship has become so formalized that the dowry values of certain kinds of appointment are at any particular time, fixed on a scale which is so closely observed as to almost have legislative sanction (2).

Taken together caste and status, and the economic factors associated with them, condition the attitude to employment right through society. Competition for white collar jobs is severe and there is a marked dearth of those seeking, for example, technical and skilled work, while acceptance of low level employment is the last resort of those to whom all other avenues are closed.

EDUCATION IN CEYLON

Education in Ceylon, as in the East generally, has its formal origin in relation and from a remote past the priest has been the "guru" (teacher) enjoying a prestige which is still given in many ways, to teachers today. Under the influence of successive western overlords education of a secular and missionary type developed which, during the past five years, has shown a remarkable growth (3). In few countries can there be a more widespread interest in education which is the concern of everyone in all classes of society—even out to comparatively remote villages (4).

Education in Ceylon however is generally interpreted as instruction and it has two marked characteristics:—

- a. It is part of the search for status because educational qualifications are the keys to those occupations to which a high status is given.
- b. It tends to be formal and abstract (5) to an extent which makes the introduction of practical work or progressive ideas difficult.

In common with other eastern countries which now enjoy a new degree of independence there is in Ceylon a very considerable revival of interest in the cultural heritage of the past. So far as schools are concerned this is seen most markedly in the legislative decision to make the vernacular languages (Sinhalese and Tamil) the official languages. The first steps in this have already been taken by the use of the vernaculars as media of instruction in the primary schools. The second steps, the spread of the vernacular upwards, are now in progress and within three years English will be a second language no longer used as a medium of instruction. Also a result of new ten-

dencies is the development of studies of the history and culture of Ceylon and of the classical oriental languages, Pali and Sanskrit.

These re-orientations of the content of education are almost the only signs of the re-evaluation of curricular needs. Education has indeed made progress, but it has been in terms of administration and of school provision, rather than reshaping its methods and contents. Evidence exists to show that the need for such a reshaping is realized (6) but such changes as have been accomplished are limited and refer to the past rather than the future. This situation is not confined to Ceylon. Elsewhere in S. E. Asia there exists a new awareness of freedom which has led to the attempt to resuscitate the culture of the past, to break from western influences which are seen as a yoke (7) and to rebuild a culture which not only lay dormant during colonial days, but which was in fact disdained by many who strove to achieve identification with a foreign overlord.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS

From a sociological view point this position is one of profound interest and importance. The present state of Ceylon, the most highly developed area of S. E. Asia, results from the expansionist policy of Britain which is today, in Ceylon, seen only as exploitation. Whatever the policy, the fact remains that Ceylon enjoys a freedom from poverty, disease and illiteracy seen nowhere else in S. E. Asia. This is the outcome of westernization.

Moreover Ceylon's economy is tied to the world markets in tea, copra and rubber. With a population of nearly seven millions and an annual increase but little short of a quarter million, Ceylon is faced with three problems:—

- a. The urgent need rapidly to increase productive capacity as the basis of improved standards of living.
- b. The urgent need for workers with practical and technical training to operate the technological schemes which are developing in the search for increased production.
- c. The urgent need to improve educational provisions in order to provide those who, by later training, can become the adults of a new technical culture.

Thus it may be said that Ceylon enjoys conditions which are the outcome of western contacts and must remain dependent upon the western world, both as a market and as the source of aid towards further progress. The first link needs little demonstration. At the end of World War II Ceylon rubber stumped and rubber trees were being burned for fuel—but the Korean conflict at once brought boom prices again. Nor does the second link need demonstration to those

who know Ceylon at present, a land full of western experts in agriculture, public health, industrial enterprise and the like who, under the auspices of U.N.O., U.N.E.S.C.O., the Colombo Plan and the voluntary effort (e.g. the Rockefeller Foundation) are trying to contribute to the social progress of Ceylon and S. E. Asia.

Here then is a country (one among several others) which has achieved its present standards by western help (even if unsought), and which is engaged in attempting to improve those standards, again by western help. Yet, at the same time, there is an attempt being made to revive a lost culture. This attempt is seen most clearly in the sphere of education where the discarding of English and the development of the vernaculars is the most obvious feature. The educationist concerned about the sociological implications of education may well ask whether, in Ceylon, there is not some degree of confusion, if not of conflict, between the aims and the methods?

In brief, to what extent are the educational provisions and procedures, which have been developing so rapidly during the past five years, in fact meeting the social needs of present day Ceylon, and the Ceylon of the future? This problem has received attention in dialectical terms in relation to the language aspect through the work of Pieris (8). Further evidence is provided by the work of Straus (9), an American Sociologist who showed that among entering students of the University of Ceylon, an overwhelming majority sought careers leading to security and prestige while none wished to enter into the plantation economies on which Ceylon's position depends. In another work Ryan (10) shows that among a small sample of school pupils vocational motives were on the lines which were described earlier in this review. In order to carry further work on this problem the writer has been engaged in an Island wide survey undertaken to test the hypothesis that "*Education in Ceylon is resulting in vocational ambitions among secondary school pupils which are related to the social needs of the country!*" The remainder of this review is devoted to a presentation of the major findings of this survey which will be published in full elsewhere (11).

A VOCATIONAL STUDY IN CEYLON

The experimental population used consisted of 1,365 pupils, spread over the nine provinces, who formed a 10% sample of school levers taking the School Certificate Examination in December 1950. For the purpose of this review attention will be confined to results from four Provinces only, these were selected as showing the greatest differences existing in Ceylon in terms of patterns of living. Some of the more important characteristics of these Provinces are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Characteristics of four selected Provinces in Ceylon.

Provinces	Western	Southern	Northern	Eastern
area	1,432	2,146	3,354	3,480
population	1,876,904	961,418	479,572	279,112
pop. density	1,310	448	142	75
towns	capital city 7 small towns	3	3	2
people	mixed Sinhalese Tamil Burgher Moor Misc.	mostly Sinhalese	mostly Tamil	mostly Tamil and Moor
language	Sinhalese and Tamil, but mostly English speaking	Sinhalese (English restricted to educated middle classes)	Tamil	Tamil
	vernacular	73.4	67.9	82.2
*literacy	English	13.3	5.7	9.1
occupations	mercantile Centre	small scale trade	northern trade centre	adventitious naval trade and small industry
	industrial Centre	rural cottage industry	few industries	
	some planting	plantation crops	crops varied but of small extent	mostly coconut
communica- tions	major sea port major air port	small sea port	subsid. air port small port	non-com- mercial naval sta- tion (U.K. Royal Navy)

outside contacts	good	restricted	with India	poor
general	most westernized and sophis- ticated	typically Sinhalese culture	typically Tamil Hindu culture	Tamil and Muslim culture least sophisti- cated
	Centre of cultural activities	conservative traditional yet enterprising Life easy	Life hard	

*Literacy figures (rate per 100 persons of all ages) are given for the chief towns of each province. It is low in all rural areas.

The information collected by questionnaire from each pupil included details of personal history, community, religion, place of birth etc. and four sets of data of vocational interest:—

1. Father's occupation and student's own vocational ambition.
2. Favourite school subjects.
3. Subjects the student would like to learn if opportunity arose.
4. Students rating of 36 occupations on a scale 1—100. The occupations were chosen so as to be known to all and to be of a type to which many might aspire.

THE RESULTS

The major results, together with some interpretative comments are presented below though none of these is given here in full nor is there any description of the statistical analyses performed. The task taken here is simply that of illustrating the major features of the vocational ambitions, opportunities and needs of Ceylon.

A. Subject preferences.

Preferences for school subjects is related to sex and Province to some extent, as shown in selected cases in Table 3.

From these figures, and from the complete data, it appears possible to suggest certain relationships. Tradition and an unsophisticated way of life gives religious knowledge a high place in Eastern Province, but relegates mathematics to a low place. The presence of the major sea port and air port in Western Province and of a sea port in Southern Province gives geography a higher rating there as compared with Eastern Province which has only a naval port or Northern Province which has but a small port. The new linguistic policy gives

TABLE 3

Centile order of selected subjects by sex and Province.

	<i>Northern</i>		<i>Eastern</i>		<i>Southern</i>		<i>Western</i>	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Mathematics	100.0	67.8	39.4	5.0	66.4	16.6	84.7	21.9
Botany	33.4	83.4	84.2	68.1	16.9	0.2	31.4	86.0
Geography	3.5	21.8	2.9	16.5	54.7	29.1	24.8	46.7
English	13.1	36.9	47.8	25.8	35.1	56.2	51.1	100.0
Oriental								
languages	65.4	56.4	100.0	52.6	100.0	42.2	100.0	63.3
Religious								
knowledge	1.7	15.6	68.9	100.0	8.2	3.0	13.6	13.2

oriental languages a relatively high rating but English still rates high in Western Province where westernization is most marked. In general it appears that stress is laid on subjects in relation to their potential economic and status values. Practical subjects, as the complete data shows, rate low.

The attitudes towards different subjects are more clearly seen by considering pupils' wishes with regard to subjects they would like to learn, as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

Percentages of pupils wishing to learn 3 selected subjects.

	<i>Northern</i>		<i>Eastern</i>		<i>Southern</i>		<i>Western</i>	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Shorthand	66.6	77.1	70.6	82.4	69.5	60.5	41.1	40.1
Rural Science	—	—	5.2	—	—	—	—	—
Applied Maths.	3.0	2.8	5.2	—	6.6	2.8	5.7	3.7

These three options were explored because they demonstrate certain points. The strong emphasis upon shorthand indicates the appeal of the white collar job as a Clerk. The fact that it is least in Western Province is probably related to the higher economic level and wider vocational horizons which turn vocational interest elsewhere and to higher levels. Rural Science has been removed from the School Curriculum and the fact that only a small percentage of boys in a single Province wish to take it up is little short of astounding in a country which has been, and for long will continue to be, primarily dependent upon rural economies. It is neglected because rural life has no appeal and because those who gain status and economic reward from rural life administer it, rather than engage in it. The position of applied mathematics also shows the lack of appeal of applied knowledge and of technical subjects — at a time when technical development is an

urgent need. All other practical subjects, such as workshop practice, engineering, radio and electrical work, and mechanical engineering were mentioned by less than 1% of the students.

Further evidence of considerable significance is seen in relation to choice of employer, as is shown in Table 5 where the appeal of government posts — which mean prestige, economic reward and security — shows very clearly.

TABLE 5

*Percentages of pupils choosing certain kinds of employer.
Boys only.*

Province	Choice made			
	Government Service	Business job	Self employment	Undecided
Northern	99.9	0.1	0.0	0.0
Eastern	85.2	3.0	8.8	3.0
Southern	84.2	4.3	9.3	2.2
Western	75.3	8.4	15.7	0.6

The effects of the wider vocational horizons in Colombo, the administrative and mercantile centre of the Island, are again shown here. What is more striking, and far more serious is however, not the differential aspect, as between Western and other Provinces, but the overwhelming search for security, prestige in Government Service and the unwillingness to take risks or lose status by self employment or business connections.

The cumulative effects of caste, tradition, economic pressure, limited horizons of employment and the search for status are best seen in considering the relative rank orders of certain careers as shown in Table 6.

TABLE 6

Rank Orders of Ratings of selected vocations.

Vocation	Rank Orders	
	Boys	Girls
Doctor	1	1
Teacher	3	2
Engineer	2	3
Farmer	4	4
Police Inspector	6	7
Government Clerk	15	13
Surveyor	17	17
Accountant	18	19
Carpenter	22	22
Potter	33	33
Hotel Waiter	35	36
Peon (office messenger)	35	35

The appeal of status, with its attendant dowry value, is seen in the position of doctor, engineer and police inspector. It should be noted that in Ceylon "engineer" has but one meaning, the administrative chief of a Government Service, such as the Railway, the Electrical Department or the Public Works Department. The fact that traditions of status can over ride economic reward is seen in relation to teacher. Here status derives from the guru and the importance of the key figure in everyone's quest for status. That economics does not enter the picture is seen from the fact that Ceylonese teachers are very poorly paid. Caste operates in two ways. It gives status to the farmer, who is a poor man in modern Ceylon, because he is of the highest caste—the "goigama". It deprives of status those of low caste, the carpenter and potter. In an authoritarian society, like that of Ceylon, those who perform personal services—the waiter and office messenger—rank lowest of all.

The list given shows a remarkable similarity in the ratings by the two sexes. For the complete list of 36 vocations the rank order correlation coefficient is .94. This is a point of interest because the vocations in the list were markedly masculine in type. There appears to be little evidence of rating in relation to interest or aptitude. All the responses are conditioned by the pervasive factors of status, prestige, economic reward, tradition or caste.

In view of the evidence presented on various aspects of vocational attitude above it can hardly be surprising that the distribution of vocational ambitions bears little relation to the vocational needs of society as shown in the existing employment patterns. The position is summarized in Table 7.

TABLE 7

*Percentage distribution of vocational ambitions and
vocational opportunities*

	<i>ambitions</i>	<i>opportunities</i>
production	24.8	64.0
distribution	23.2	21.0
services	52.0	15.0

With regard to the last of these items, services, it must be noted that this term includes two kinds of vocation, professional services (doctor, advocate, etc.) and personal services (messenger and waiter, etc.). Evidence presented earlier shows that the latter rate low, so that the position is in fact more extreme than is suggested in Table 7 for the 52% seeking services are in fact competing for professions which absorb only 6% of the gainfully employed.

Discussion.

The data presented above shows, in a variety of ways, the effects which come from the operation of a series of factors, such as caste, tradition and the search for status, which culminate in a complete disparity between vocational ambition and vocational opportunity. There is no relation between vocational ambitions and the country's needs and the hypothesis formulated must be rejected.

Before considering certain implications it is necessary to notice two points. This survey was carried out among secondary school pupils (=high school) whose education will naturally make them aim at high level appointments rather than at the lower level of productive work. Secondly it must be said that the new movements in education date only from the gaining of Independence in 1948.

With regard to the first point it is also important for it to be realized that the methods of production are being changed. Industries are being developed and mechanisation of patterns and processes of living is being accelerated under the ever increasing impact of western technology. This acceptance of a technological culture is based on a clear understanding of the need to increase production. Technology however needs technicians who are the fruit of an education which is practical, scientific and orientated toward the applications of science to social needs. It is widely admitted that Ceylon is short of technicians, and the effect of the shortage has been demonstrated in the restricted success (and too often down right failure) of past attempts to develop industry under Government sponsorship. Moreover, as is well known in the West, the manual worker and the technician need a not inconsiderable level of education, especially for the production of the skilled overseers, foremen and managers who play so important a part in modern industrial organization. Where such people will come from, in a society where few wish to be producers and many want to enter the professional classes — and where manual work is despised and given low economic rewards — it is difficult to see. Yet they must be found if the present schemes of industrialization are to be successful. And on the success of these depends the raising of the standards of living.

Solution of the problem is not likely to be easy. The roots of culture run deep and the East cannot yet afford to overcome traditional attitudes to manual and technical work by increased financial reward. But, whatever the attempts made, it seems clear that education must play a part. The educational developments of the past five years in Ceylon, which have their counter parts in India and elsewhere, will be put forward as evidence that education is playing a part and that in time its effects will be seen.

The frailty of this defence can be shown in two ways. Most of the educational changes which have been effected lie in the administrative field while most of the curricular changes are tied to nationalist ideas and look back to the past in terms of culture and language. The school curriculum is, in many ways, the most static feature of the educational world. In place of the present slow and backward looking changes there is need for a new orientation in the curriculum which must be cast in a socially determined mould in order to produce the kind of men and women who can exploit the opportunities of the new world around them. This is a need which spreads beyond Ceylon to other, less developed and more backward parts of S. E. Asia.

Education in the East in general, and in Ceylon in particular, has been the key to the social progress of the individual because it offered escape from the factors which limit social mobility. In under developed countries this has resulted in what is well known already in the West, the drift from rural to urban life. Education, in virtue of western models has been unsuited to Eastern needs, and because of its centralized and authoritative organization has applied a curriculum which is town centered to rural conditions. The result has been that youth has been made dissatisfied with the rural environment through training for kinds of employment which are restricted in extent. The result is obvious and has been clearly demonstrated in for example, the white collar unemployed of India.

Removal of the rural population and unsuitable training means a wastage of potential skill and losses of production, as well as the failure to produce what the East so much needs, the well educated individual willing to work at production in the manual sphere. This failure to produce those who must be the basis of a technological culture is a threat to the vast plans of expansion which characterize S. E. Asia today, and into which the West is pouring money and effort.

Nor must two other implications be overlooked. Ceylon, already greatly divided on religious, ethnic, linguistic and caste grounds is faced with the difficult task of welding her sub-cultures into a nation. The present emphasis in education is tending towards the formation of an élite in which the manual worker, already of low social prestige, will have no place. This social danger has its political counterpart. Within Ceylon, and elsewhere in S. E. Asia, democratic ideas are struggling in their development against an authoritarian social structure. Failure to come to fruition will add to the frustrations engendered in other ways — and the failure of democracy is a threat not only to S. E. Asia, but to the peace of the world.

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSE TO CULTURAL DETERMINANTS

T. L. Green

Introduction

What we call modern education was brought to the East by western missionaries, traders and imperialists over a period of some four hundred years past. Now, at the end of this period there exists in many parts of S. E. Asia educational provision which appears closely akin to that of the West. This kinship is however more apparent than real because, though the subjects of the curriculum may be identical, the whole approach to teaching and learning is very different. It is thus a matter of sociological interest to the educationist to explore three points:—

- a. What are the main features of the differences of teaching and learning in East and West?
- b. What are the social and historical factors responsible for these differences?
- c. What effects do these differences have upon the individual?

Exploration of any one of these would not only be a formidable task, but a task hardly yet possible because the essential fundamental research has not been done. Despite this it is possible, so far as Ceylon is concerned, to give a brief sketch which should be of interest, and one which, as will be shown at the end of this short review, is not without significance for the future social and technical progress of the country.

In presenting this sketch it is essential to emphasize the tentative nature of the results put forward and to point out that while academic caution might well counsel postponement, the potential significance of the results justifies their use as an incentive to more extended studies in this field.

Teaching and Learning in the East.

The teaching situation in Ceylon has an authoritarian social climate. The teacher is a dominative factor and the possibility of an integrative relationship is almost unrealized. In such class room situations, which are backed up by homes demanding implicit obedience, there is no place for democratic practices. Thus progressive techniques of activity type are almost non-existent. Practical work is reduced to a minimum, even in what are accepted as laboratory subjects and, though school excursions are common, there is little if any attempt to use survey and related methods. The content of education tends to be abstract, academic and formal with a strong emphasis

upon the informational aspect, to the neglect of social implications or applied aspects. The general atmosphere is verbal with an emphasis upon memorization and acceptance is expected without any thought of criticism. A very marked feature is the neglect of the concept of maturation, so that pupils are to a large extent engaged in attempting too soon that which is too difficult. This position raises no comment because success is sought in terms of remembering rather than of understanding.

In situations of this kind it is a not unexpected corollary to find that teaching is devoid of group work or of the integrated efforts of individuals. Pupils, working as individuals form a class which has numerical size but no social unity, all are doing the same work at the same time. There is no project work, no dealing in units and assignments, no collaboration in which each individual feels a sense of responsibility to contribute to a growing whole.

The historical determinants.

There are a number of casual factors in this situation which are difficult to distinguish because they are so closely interwoven, though all can be summed up in a single phrase, a reactionary belief in traditionalism.

The authoritative attitudes and position of the teacher finds its origin in the "guru" tradition. In a remote antiquity, stretching back at least two thousand years the function of the teacher was combined with that of the priest. The priest-teacher was the "guru". Priesthood conferred an authority which was augmented by the practice whereby each guru had one, or perhaps a few pupils, though the position was that of leader and acolyte rather than teacher and pupil. The pupils lived with the guru from whom they learned and to whom they rendered personal services, almost as domestic servants. This guru tradition still survives and, while it may well have its good points, it lays a foundation for a purely authoritarian relationship. The pupil is expected to venerate his teacher. In rural areas the beginning of school term is marked by the ceremonial gift of betel leaves and it is not unknown for pupils to kneel in the act of worship to a well liked teacher. Such a background confers on the teacher a status which is accompanied by no little power which becomes manifest in the authoritarian social climate of the class room.

The verbal rather than the practical approach to teaching and learning appears to stem from two factors. Caste has conferred upon manual work a low status, a point already demonstrated in an earlier paper in this series. There is thus a reaction against doing practical work of almost any kind. In addition learning, from the

earliest times, has had a verbalized basis with memorization as its aim. Machine printing came late to the East and old leaf writings were doubtless as scarce and valuable as the manuscripts of early Europe. Thus learning historically has a verbal basis. Such writings as were available tended to be concerned with the "revealed word" and the "canons of belief" of the religious thought of the period. As such it was the task of the pupil to learn it, not to be critical of it.

From a very early age learning by rote takes place and, so great is the volume to be memorized that mastery of some of the classical writings may take ten years. Such learning was the staple of education in the hands of religious institutions in the past and it still plays a part today. Among Buddhists it is customary to determine, upon astrological grounds, the auspicious time for learning the first letter. Thereafter the mastery of the skills of communication depends upon memorization of sounds and symbols, then words and phrases — only very late is attention given to the purposes of communication, the exchange of ideas. The grip of tradition as an agent of conservation is still operative because the *pirivenas* (temple schools), which still exist in large numbers, continue to teach by methods which have remained unchanged, or but little changed, from the days of the ancient Buddhist universities, such as that of Nalanda.

The content of the ancient writings may be secular or religious. Of the former, erotic and epic elements are most marked. Of the latter the content is mostly in the field of theological theory, metaphysics and philosophy. In other words the study of the past is concerned with the study of ideas rather than of things and attention to science and experimentation is, in the modern sense, non-existent.

Lastly, as a determinant of the cultural setting of education, reference must be made to some aspects of the socio-economic structure of society in Ceylon at present. Some reference has already been made to this in the paper on "Vocational Problems in Education in S. E. Asia" (page 380) so that here it is only necessary to point out that vocational avenues are, at present, extremely restricted. Occupations which carry prestige and economic reward are of administrative type and are mostly in Government Service. Conditions of entry into these have only now begun to lay stress on technological or scientific interests or information and there has been a tendency for a literary type of education, with economics as its only excursion into quantitative disciplines, to be the favoured approach. Even those with qualifications in the sciences have found it more rewarding to enter administrative work than to take up work as practical scientists.

Taken as a whole it will be seen that the historical and social conditions so briefly reviewed in this section have tended towards the neglect of practical subjects and of a practical approach in learning and teaching as a whole. It is indeed true that ancilliary factors are operative. The fact that the provisions for practical and scientific education are not well developed nor widely available, the insufficiency of the material equipments of practical and scientific education and the dearth of science teachers all tend to impose a verbal and non-practical pattern on education.

The implications of this, in regard to the patterning of the individual, of such obvious importance to society, have received little attention, other than the subjective realization that attitudes, motives and goals are different in the East from those in the West.

The response of the individual.

Although this is the only one of our three points which can be subjected to quantitative study it is far from easy to do so because of the lack of objective tests developed for use in Ceylon. However, by a careful selection of methods certain results have been obtained which appear to be of sufficient interest to warrant attention. These results come from a number of separate fields which are dealt with in the following sections.

Measures of intelligence.

Investigations based on the use of Raven's Progressive Matrices (1938) a non-verbal, non-pictorial test indicate that Ceylonese groups perform at similar levels to comparable groups in England. Use of the California Test of Mental Maturity (Advanced S Form 1938) however at once discloses a marked differentiation between language and non-language items, as shown in Table 1 which gives some typical results.

TABLE 1

Mean Centile Scores on California M.M.

	N of sample	language factors	non-language factors
Training College 1st Year	100	48.7	5.2
" " 2nd Year	100	69.5	4.2
University graduates	100	87.7	4.6
Technical College Students	151	38.5	13.8
U.S.A. Norms	—	50.0	50.0

These figures confirm a finding by Straus (1) who explained his results as a response to a formal abstract and verbal type of educa-

tion. By item analysis of the scores on non-language items it is possible to demonstrate the influence of a cultural factor as shown in

TABLE 2

*Item analysis of sub-tests
type of item*

*California M.M.Adv.S.
1947*

Mean % of correct solutions

Form relations	22.9
Three dimensional perception	26.9
Pattern perception	41.3
N = 451.	

The important point in these results is the relatively greater success in dealing with items involving pattern perception as compared with items involving form relations (of geometrical figures) or three dimensional perception. Traditional patterns are the most widely used form of ornament and form a basis of most of the art teaching of Ceylon. Handling and doing, learning by doing, are restricted, so that spatial concepts are poorly developed.

Special aptitudes and abilities.

Having first obtained results which suggest that cultural determinants were responsible for a specific patterning of general intellectual abilities it appeared desirable to ask whether this affected response to a test usually considered as diagnostic of technical aptitudes. For this purpose the D.A.T. Space Relations Test was used. The results are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Mean Score on D.A.T. Space Relations.

U.S. norm	+ 49.8
Ceylon Score	- 1.9
N = 151 Technical College Students	

The nature of the D.A.T. Space Relation Test suggests that it is free of cultural loading and the available standardization data suggests that it is a measure of a single function, rather than of a complex function. This single function which relates to the ability to manipulate three dimensional objects in ideational terms, is obviously poorly developed in the group of students tested. As this function is postulated to be an important element in success at technical work, and as the student group tested consisted of the entrant students of Ceylon's only Technical College, the implications are of no little importance.

The same group of students was subjected to the Test of Mechanical Comprehension devised by the Australian Council for Educational Research. The mean score for the group, 9.34 appears to be

lower than the score expected from a comparable Australian group. However it is not desired to attach too great an importance to this set of results because a limiting cultural factor may be operative in as much as the general environment of living in Ceylon is not highly mechanized.

Of greater interest are the results of applying Alexander's Test of Practical Ability to a sample of school boys aged 13-15, drawn from a number of schools. This is an individual test which, in Ceylon, is found to require at least an hour. For this, and other reasons, the total number tested is at present only 50. The results are shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

Results of applying Alexander Test to Ceylonese boys. N=50

% scoring above appropriate English norm = 92

% scoring at the same level as

English norm = 6

% scoring below appropriate English norm = 2

Mean number of points above English norm = 41.6 points on standard scale.

Occupational Interests.

In another paper in this series (page 380) it has been shown that vocational attitudes and ambitions in Ceylon have a marked pattern in which interest in manual and productive work rates low. This aspect was further explored with the California Occupational Interest Inventory. It proved necessary to modify this by altering the wording to suit Ceylon conditions in a small number of cases but the changes introduced were not such as to alter the essential structure in any way. Results are presented in Table 5.

TABLE 5

*Mean centile scores of Ceylonese groups on California
Occupational Interest Inventory
Field of Interests.*

	<i>Personal Social</i>	<i>Natural</i>	<i>Mecha- nical</i>	<i>Busi- ness</i>	<i>Arts</i>	<i>Science</i>	<i>N</i>
U.S. norms	50	50	50	50	50	50	—
Police recruits	81	31	24	60	55	49	—
Labour Inspectors	69	50	28	47	63	34	69
Teachers	75	38	26	32	71	52	172
High School boys	62	44	40	48	58	34	81

Discussion

The situation which emerges from the data presented can be put in the following statements:—

- a. *Manual skill among Ceylonese boys is high*, a finding in keeping with observations of adults in a society in which intricate craftsmanship is exhibited with primitive appliances.
- b. *General levels of intelligence are comparable with those elsewhere*, a test finding substantiated by the high level of performance of Ceylonese students (for example) in university courses outside Ceylon.
- c. *Intellectual abilities are sharply differentiated into verbal and non-language skills*, the former being much better developed.
- d. *Abilities in the field of spatial perception*, as measured by tests, and among technical and non-technical students are low.

These characteristics of the individual appear to be the results of cultural determinants which have their roots in present educational procedures, which themselves reflect values preserved from a traditional past. In brief, a verbal and unpractical education with a heavy emphasis upon acceptance and memorization exists in schools and is further supported by home conditions which inhibit freedom, experimentation, criticism and the search for experience. Pupils in Ceylon learn to respond to familiar situations in approved ways. When faced with unfamiliar situations and novel problems they fail, not because they lack skill or intellectual ability, but because they lack resourcefulness and inventiveness and the power to deal with practical things on ideational planes.

This situation has social implications of grave importance which have been mentioned earlier (page 381). In the drive for greater productivity in Ceylon international organizations and various western powers are expending time, effort and money on a considerable scale. A basic part of the many schemes in operation is the development of a technology. For this technicians are needed. These should be the products of education, but education in Ceylon is failing to meet this need.

A further feature, not yet open to experimental investigation, but at least in need of comment, concerns proposals with regard to selection for secondary education. From 1952 onwards it is proposed to apply a Selective test (comprising arithmetic, language and intelligence tests). Those who fail to achieve a certain level will be directed into practical education. These will tend to be the least able. The High Schools will offer practical subjects, but the reception they will

receive may be estimated from earlier comments (page 383). The position will then be that the country's practically trained workers will be of the lowest levels of ability while none of the more able will have chosen to "come up through the works" owing to status values. Ceylon will thus fail to develop that former class, possessed of practical works, experience and high ability which, as the World Bank Mission Report on Ceylon pointed out, are essential elements in technology.

Conclusion.

The results presented are merely those of preliminary pilot studies. Though they are in keeping with other more extensive findings concerning vocational attitudes and values the need to extend work of this kind is obvious. This is not a problem of merely academic interest to educationist or sociologist, but a potential threat to the orderly social and economic progress of Ceylon—and hence to the world. Nor is it confined only to Ceylon, because educational procedures and traditions are closely similar over the whole of S. E. Asia. At a time when practical workers at all levels are needed, as the basis of improved productive output, educational procedures are patterning the individual in ways which cannot make the required contribution to technical and manual skills, interests and attitudes.